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INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF COOPTATION 
The concept of cooptation is at the same time very popular and 
quite neglected. One frequently reads or hears the phrase mentioned in 
passing, as though there were agreement as to what it meant, but there 
is a dearth of work on the subject. In one of the few works focusing 
directly on the subject, Karl Loewenstein (1973:21) decries the 11 com-
plete lack of systematic research on cooptation 11 and notes that the 
standard references in sociology and political science either mention it 
not at all or contain only a few sentences on the subject. There exist 
only two books, to the current author's knowledge, in which cooptation 
is a major concept: Loewenstein's work in German, which is an attempt 
to develop a model of cooptation, and one work in English, Selznick's 
TVA and the Grass Roots (1949), a case study of the TVA using cooptation 
as a basic concept. 
The neglect of the concept, coupled with the varieties of its use, 
as will be documented below, would be enough to justify the current in-
vestigation. Additional justification rests on two bases: 1) insofar 
as power is a basic process in all societies, organizations, and groups, 
and since cooptation is a part of the power process, it has import; and 
2) hopefully, the reader will agree that cooptation is a ubiquitous phe-
nomenon, occurring just as ordinarily as other recognized social pro-
cesses, such as assimilation, accommodation, or revolution. 
l 
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The intent of this investigation is to clarify the concept of co-
optation and show its use as an analytic and explanatory device, and to 
formulate some notions about typical patterns and outcomes of the coopt-
ation process. To begin, my working definition of a threat model of co-
optation will be presented along with a model of a power system which, 
as will be seen, is the locus for the occurrence of cooptation. Then, 
several other models of cooptation will be examined with critiques indi-
cating the need for the new conceptualization represented by the threat 
model. 
Working Definition and Framework 
First, here is a brief definition of cooptation as it will be used 
within the threat model. Cooptation occurs if, in a system of power, 
actors who pose a threat to the powerholder are intentionally brought 
into positions and situations in which they come to participate to a 
greater extent in the official process of the system in question. It is 
crucial that there be opposition between the powerholder and the dissi-
dent actor prior to occurrence of cooptation. Without the imputation of 
opposition, one cannot speak of cooptation. 
To explicate this definition, a model of a power system must first 
be adopted. The model here espoused of a power system has two levels: 
the official, formal 11 planfully established 11 sector, referred to as the 
state, the public sector, or the powerholder, and the "unplanned, in-
formal, spontaneous" sector, also known as the people or civil sector 
{Sariola, 1972:11). I do not share the Weberian {1964:152) notion of 
power as an ability exercised despite resistance, but rather I see the 
powerholder attempting to realize his intentions given that resistance 
by the people is a normal process of the system. Resistances may not 
exist overtly at every moment in every system, but they are at least a 
long-range possibility in any system. The potential background of re-
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sistance forces us to view the exercise of power as involving a tension 
between the public sector and the civil sector. 
_,,/ 
Legitimacy, defined as existing if the people view the powerholder 
as having the right to rule, is a problem for the powerholder. He must 
tread the line between coercion, power based on the threat of or use of 
negative sanctions (de Crespigny, 1970:43ff), and authority (legitimated 
power). Power is the generic concept, with authority and coercion being 
poles of a continuum. Any actual exercise of power exists somewhere be-
tween these extremes and involves elements of both. The powerholder 
exists in a tension between coercion and authority in two senses. First, 
there is a trade-off between coercion and authority, since the power-
holder uses up his supply of legitimacy when he resorts to coercion. 
Similarly, less coercion is necessary when a powerholder has high legi-
timacy. Second, because the exercise of power involves dealing with new 
situations which require the transcendence of or departure from tradi-
tional modes of action, no.powerholder's actions can ever be fully legi-
timated. Even if one accepts the possibility of power being legitimated 
in form (as in legal-rational authority), it is problematic whether the 
substance of a new policy or command can be fully legitimate, unless the 
new directive is a response to overwhelming pressure from the civil sec-
tor. Hence, even the powerholder who has high legitimacy must resort to 
some actions which fall along the coercion-authority continuum in the 
area of non-legitimate power. 
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This conception of power may be termed a 11 decay 11 model. No power-
holder may permanently maintain control or fully carry out his original 
plan. Power systems have a tendency to decay for a number of reasons, 
of which the following are a few: the system's legitimating ideology 
may cease to fit the facts of power and/or be discredited among the peo-
ple; changes may spontaneously arise in the civil sector (e.g., resource 
deficits due to population pressure); schisms in the civil sector (e.g., 
ethnic conflict) may arise; a previously quiescent group may come to 
realize its potential for resistance (e.g., labor movements); and there 
is the possibility of external political threat. An analogy may be made 
to a physical system. 1 Just as the assumptions of thermodynamics re-
quire the input of energy to maintain an ordered physical state, this 
model of power contains the assumption that there must be an input of 
legitimacy or force to maintain the unity of a power system. Resistances 
tend to develop and are a threat to the unity of the system and thus must 
be eliminated, neutralized with the input of legitimacy, or channeled 
through some sort of a filter (e.g., bureaucratic complaint mechanisms) 
if the existence of the system is to be insured. 
Taking this analytic division of the power process into two levels, 
there exist two basic occurrences in any system: action by the power-
holder onto the subjects and resistances by the civil sector toward the 
powerholder. There is a potential two-way flow of power. Thus, there 
are two problems for the state. First, it must attempt to insure that 
its policies, laws, and administration will be accepted by the people. 
Second, it must deal with the potential and actual resistances and de-
mands that arise from below. 
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The powerholder must solve these problems in order to prevent the 
dissolution of the system. The solution to the first difficulty, assum-
ing the problematic case in which the people do not spontaneously and 
universally accept the actions of the powerholder, comes via supplies of 
legitimacy, and through the basis of legitimacy, an ideology (defined 
here as a unified set of political beliefs, which function to justify 
the scope, form, and substance of the state's power). Solutions to the 
second problem require what Sariola (1972:270) has termed 11 the imperative 
of forced yielding. 11 Yielding involves modification of the original 
policies of the powerholder so as to soften or concede to the demands of 
the civil sector. The powerholder might expand suffrage, allow freedom 
of speech, create bureaucratic agencies to deal with the complaints of 
the dissidents, or allow increased participation in decision making. A 
contemporary example of yielding occurred when Richard Nixon, in response 
to civil sector pressure during the Watergate affair, finally relin-
quished the tape recordings. 
For analytic purposes, these two problems, that of gaining the ac-
ceptance of policy and that of _9eal_ing __ with ___ resjstance, and their solu-
tions, .legitimacy and yielding, have bee~ presented as though they were 
unconnected. One complicating factor is that yielding, being itself a 
source of legitimacy, is a solution to the problem of acceptance of poli-
cies. In a parallel fashion, sufficient supplies of legitimacy may pre-
vent the development of resistance. Furthermore, this discussion assumes 
that the powerholder chooses to avoid the use of coercion. Coercion can 
be a solution to the problem of implementing policy, as happens when the 
National Guard is used to assist in school integration, and coercion can 
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be a solution to resistance as well, as when police are used to disperse 
demonstrators. Powerholders generally avoid coercion as a solution to 
these problems, since it is expensive monetarily and because it may 
destroy legitimacy. The destruction of legitimacy hastens the decay or 
overthrow of the system because, as stated above, it is an input required 
for system maintenance. 
Basic Concepts 
Let us now return to the issue of cooptation per~- Cooptation is 
mode o·f yielding to resistance. The "threats" mentioned in the defi-
·nition can be classified as resistance arising from the civil sector, 
threatening the unity of the system, and eroding the legitimacy of the 
powerholder. These threats may be actual, latent, or projected. Several 
types of threats could be preliminarily identified. One category of 
threat would be actors, movements, and organizations who are actually 
part of an organized opposition to the powerholder. An important char-
acteristic of such threats is that they possess power separate from and 
in opposition to the official (legitimate) system governed by the power-
holder. They are power systems themselves yet they exist within larger 
~ystems. An example of cooptation here would occur if a labor union 
leader, threatened by an organized rank and file protest against union 
corruption, formed an investigative committee and appointed some of the 
dissidents to the committee. A second category of threat would be con-
stituted by unorganized actors who share an interest opposed to a policy 
of the powerholder or even opposed to organizing principles of the sys-
tem itself. This threat is aptly described by the phrase 11 a community 
of interest. 11 It is a collecti9n of persons who share a common basis of 
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interest but who are not actually members of an organization designed 
to further this interest against the powerholder. Such actors do not 
possess the countervailing power represented by a power system dwelling 
within the beast, as in the first category, but the powerholder always 
stands to lose legitimacy if he does not yield to their interest. 
They also threaten the public sector because their withdrawal of sup-
port from the powerholder may spread to other persons. Or, members of a 
community of interest might decide to organize and resist the power-
holder. If one takes students as a community of interest, their parti-
cipation in university governance would constitute cooptation. A third 
category of potential threat includes actors who have not previously 
been members of the power system. When a system expands, as in coloni-
zation or in territorial acquisitions, the new subjects are ipso facto 
a threat to the powerholder. The powerholder has not had experience 
with them and cannot gauge his legitimacy among them, nor has he had a 
chance to publicize his ideology and thereby legitimate himself among 
them. The British colonial practice of creating civil service positions 
fornativeswas cooptation oriented to this threat. A closely related 
but analytically separate type of threat occurs when the public sector 
expands its scope to actions not previously legitimated within the sys-
tem. Selznick's TVA documents such a case. The TVA constituted an ex-
pansion of government action into a new realm, and met threats in part 
by bringing citizens into official positions in the organization. Fin-
ally, apathetic actors are a fourth category of threat to the state. 
Those who show so little interest in the system that they do not support 
or oppose it threaten the powerholder. They do not participate in the 
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system except by being under its control. This can be convenient for 
the powerholder, but it is also ·a problem. Marginals leave the power-
holder in the position of ignorance of their attitudes and desires, 
since he receives no input from them. They evidence a lack of legiti-
macy and they hold the potential to become an organized opposition or a 
community of interest. In a state with low proportions of citizens vot-
ing (e.g., the U.S.), the apathy threat exists. The appropriate coopt-
ive maneuver might be easing the difficulties of voter registration to 
increase participation. Threats may be actual or perceived. If the 
powerholder perceives a group as a potential threat at some future time, 
that is sufficient. 
Implicit in these categories of threat is a key characteristic of 
the concept of cooptation: the labeling of an event as one of coopta-
tion 1nvolves imputation of Q.P..RQ.SJ-t.i.on between the powerholder and the 
'; coopted. member of the system. The observer who speaks of cooptation is 
claiming that the coopted group or actor possessed power separate from 
that of the legitimate system (at least potentially) and that the parti-
san's interests or desires oppose those of the powerholder. If no oppo-·-7 
sition were to exist, what would occur would be merely normal advance- /i 
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ment in a hierarchy. A young executive who assents to the ideals of a 
corporation's owners and is moved into the leadership would not be said 
to have been coopted. This would only be a case of selecting, recruit-
ing, or assimilating members in a typical fashion, i.e., one in which 
11 friendlies 11 are promoted. What makes cooptation interesting is precise-
ly that the leaders are recruiting hostiles into their midst. Likewise, 
without the imputing of motive (intention) to the powerholder, coopta-
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tion loses meaning. If it is identified sheerly on a behavioral level 
as involving the move from lower to higher levels of participation, co-
optation is indistinguishable from upward mobility. It is not just that 
participation has been achieved by the threat group, but that the power-
holder has encouraged or created the structure of participation. 
Another element in the definition requires explanation, namely 
"participation in the official political process." An actor partici-
pates officially if he engages in policy determination or implementation 
within a structure nominally {legally) under control of the powerholder 
or at least sanctioned by him. Participation could range from voting, 
to citizen participation in public meetings set up to solicit opinion on 
some issue, up through membership in the administration of the state, to 
appointed or elected office. 
There are several possible outcomes of cooptation to be thematized 
here; the issue upon which they hinge is the defusing of the threat. 
Since cooptation involves yielding, the powerholder aims at softening 
the impact of the threat so as to defuse it. While it is always problem-
atic whether this is successful, one can point to two generic types of 
outcomes which are successful from the point of view of the powerholder: 
l) Defusal of the threat may come through the 11 legitimacy payoff 11 to the 
powerholder. He may point to the fact of increased formal participation 
and use this as an ideological justification for his power. The exten-
sion of suffrage to women illustrates this. 2) Cooptation can defuse 
threats by inserting a 11 filter 11 between the powerholder and threatening 
group. With participation in the official system, the demands .of the 
threat· now .impact on the powerholder through a structure of participation 
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(filter) which is nominally under control of the powerholder and may 
even have been created by him. The previously cited example of student 
participation in university governance fits here. Finally, one must 
recognize that unsuccessful outcomes may occur--the filtering and legi-
timacy functions may not manifest themselves or may even backfire. The 
structure of participation may allow too much participation and changes 
in the system may result. The rise of the third estate in Europe was a 
failure of a structure of participation extended to a threatening group. 
In the long run, it did not filter the pressures from the rising bour-
geoisie who used it to achieve eventual domination of the system. Or, 
the threatening group could see the offered participation as a sham and 
react against any attempt to make ideological capital out of it. Their 
opposition to the powerholder would increase in this case. Charges of 
tokenism made by ethnic groups in reaction to offered political partici-
pation in the U.S. exemplify this failure outcome of cooptation. 
Review of the Literature 
Having presented my threat model of cooptation, I now wish to dis-
cuss other models of cooptation. For rough heuristic purposes these can 
be categorized into several basic types: the traditional elite recruit-
ment model (Loewenstein, Fleron, et al.); the formal organization model 
(Selznick, Thompson, Allen); the power-protest model (Gamson, Spector 
and Kitsuse, threat model); and the political socialization model (Greer 
and Orleans, Domhoff). 
The traditional model of cooptation describes a process of elite 
recruitment which might be called quasi-election. In this usage, it re-
fers to llthe election to vacancies on a legislative or.other body by the 
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votes of the existing members of the body, as opposed to election by an 
outside constituency" (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1969, 6:458). Karl Loe-
wenstein (1973:18), in what is the most comprehensive work on cooptation, 
adopts this usage as his basic definition. He places cooptation within 
a listing of modes of investiture into office, including as other types 
such processes as nomination and appointment. Mackenzie, in an article 
on elections (1968, 5:2f), also places cooptation in the context of elec-
tion and appointment, with cooptation being a middle ground between 
these two. In his view, cooptation involves the selection of a colleague, 
whereas appointment involves a subordinate and election by a superior. In 
general, the traditional model of cooptation treats it as a formal leader-
ship recruitment process characteristic of certain organizations. Loewen-
stein's (1973:15) exemplar for cooptation illustrates this aspect. He 
cites the French Academy, an elite cultural organization which fills va-
cancies in its membership by a vote of the existing members; it is a 
power-:holding.organization which has as its official recruitment mechan-
ism a particular process, namely cooptation. An important characteristic 
here is that this process is officially provided for in the constitution 
or tradition of the group. This is implicit in the traditional model of 
cooptation. 
The official aspect is one of the divergences between the tradi-
tional and threat models of cooptation, since no such restriction is 
contained within the threat model. The major difference between these 
two models lies in the emphasis placed on the concept of threat. Coopta-
tion as an official recruitment process apparently could take place in 
any organization, regardless of whether the civil sector posed a threat. 
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A connection does exist between the traditional model and the one 
presented here, however, in that the particular technique described 
(quasi-election) would be one way in which cooptation could occur. A 
threatened group of powerholders could select one of the people into 
their membership, a situation which would fit both the classic model as 
well as my own. Furthermore, Loewenstein implicitly recognizes the im-
portance of threat to cooptation, since he sees cooptation as one way 
by which privileged groups maintain their unity and identity. Coopta-
tion, Loewenstein claims (1973:191), is frequently a means "to protect 
the existence and future of a group in its present form" and he agrees 
(1973:193) that cooptation (in his sense) can be used to give political 
participation in the organization to "rival powers." However, the em-
phasis for Loewenstein is not the defusing of rivals by the incorpora-
tion of previously hostile elements into leadership, but rather recruit-
ing people whose presence in leadership will serve to preserve the co-
opting group in its present form. While this could lead to the selec-
tion of threatening actors, what Loewenstein has in mind, as his examples 
(the French Academy, the European Common Market) indicate, is more like-
ly the recruitment of new members whose views are compatible with those 
of the status quo. Thus, while he adumbrates the notion of threat, it 
is not central to his model. In sum, then, the traditional model of co-
optation, while referring to processes of power, does not sufficiently 
focus on threat and is overly restrictive in its concentration on co-
optation as a constitutionally-provided-for procedure. 
Frederic Fleron (1969) presents a concept of cooptation which is 
similar to the traditional model in that it delineates an elite recruit-
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ment process. He describes cooptation as a process which occurs when a 
political elite lacks skills necessary for the management of the system. 
It obtains these skills by recruiting into subordinate positions of au-
thority persons who have previously been a member of another {e.g., tech~ 
nical or scientific) elite {1969:181-182). This is a technique resorted 
to by powerholders with particular problems, namely deficiencies in ex-
pertise. In his study of the Soviet system of political leadership, 
Fleron {1969:177) operationalizes ·cooptation by classffying as coopted 
those persons who entered into the political elite after at least seven 
years in a career outside of politics. Fleron {1969:181-182) sees co-
optation as a characteristic process of some political systems, as his 
model includes 11 cooptative 11 political leadership systems as one of sev-
eral modes of adaptation of political systems. 
In addition to solving the adaptation problem of obtaining neces-
sary skills, cooptation may have several other results. According to 
Fleron {1969:190), there are five reasons why a political elite might 
coopt members of specialized elites: 1) to gain legitimacy, particular-
ly vis-a-vis the specialized elites; 2) to obtain necessary skills; 3) 
to increase 11 access 11 to the specialized elites; 4) 11 to share power 11 ; and 
5) 11 to share responsibility. 11 His consideration of these reasons for co-
optation, particularly 1), 3), 4), and 5) brings his model somewhat 
closer to the threat model. In particular, he argues that cooptation of 
specialized elites in the Soviet Union has increased the legitimacy of 
the regime in the eyes of the specialized elites. There is the impli-
cation here that the specialized elites withheld their support from the 
political elite prior to cooptation. If so, a threat situation {that of 
14 
a community of interest) would have existed. There also is a threat 
involved in an actor 1s possession of skills the powerholders need. The 
actor 1 s ability to withhold these skills from the state is always a po-
tential problem for the powerholder if he needs these skills to imple-
ment his policies. Cooptation would be particularly appropriate as a 
means to get these skills, since it may be difficult to coerce someone 
into using his mental abilities to the fullest. 
Fleron 1 s model, like Loewenstein 1 s, does hint at some of the same 
issues of t~reat and has a further resemblance to the threat model in 
referring to the giving of political participation to previously unre-
presented actors. The insufficiency of Fleron 1 s conceptualization is 
the failure to make threat an explicit defining characteristic of the 
cooptation process. 
The person most responsible for bringing the concept of cooptation 
into contemporary sociology is Philip Selznick (1948, 1949) who used it 
in the context of the sociology of formal organization.2 It is striking 
that Selznick (1949:13), while acknowledging the unfamiliarity of the 
concept of cooptation, recognizes it to be an old concept and yet does 
not cite any sources for it. 
He uses the perspective of an organization adapting to its environ-
ment, with cooptation being a way to meet certain environmental pres-
sures. Selznick (1949:13) states: 11 [C]ooptation is the process of ab-
sorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structures 
of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stablity or 
existence. 11 Two different types of cooptation may occur, depending on 
the character of the environmental threat to be met. If the threat is 
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one of a diffuse lack of legitimacy with people at large on the part of 
the organization, formal cooptation results. There is a public (open, 
recognized) broadening of the leadership in order to achieve legitimacy 
(Selznick, l949:13f). Actors are brought in who "reflect the sentiment 
or possess the confidence" of the people (1949:14). As examples, Selz-
-
nick suggests company unions and the practice of bringing natives into 
colonial bureaucracies. There is another case in which formal coopta-
tion takes place. When it is useful to establish "the forms of self-
government11 (1949:14), as in a government housing project, the leaders 
may institute citizens' committees or other devices of participation. 
These provide channels of communication for the powerholder and also, 
according to Selznick, (1949:14), increase legitimacy by sharing the re-
sponsibility for power. In either of these cases, the essential charac-
teristic of formal cooptation is that it does not involve the intention 
on the part of the leaders to actually share power. It is window dress-
ing, as the powerholder wishes to give the "forms of participation but 
not the substance" (Selznick, 1949:14). Informal cooptation (Selznick, 
1949:14f), on the other hand, involves an actual sharing of power. It 
arises as a response to specific alternative, competing, or dissident 
loci of power. This form of cooptation, as its name indicates, does not 
take place openly; to openly acknowledge the power of other (resistant) 
actors would be problematic for the coopting powerholder. Selznick 
(1949:260) hypothesizes that cooptation involving "actual sharing of 
power" will typically be informal, whereas cooptation as an attempt to 
gain legitimacy will generally be formal, an hypothesis which he supports 
with the case history of the TVA. 
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Obviously, the current author's model has been influenced by Selz-
nick. He clearly acknowledges the element of threat involved in co-
optation, connects cooptation to problems of power and legitimacy, and 
highlights the expansion of a power:.system as .a .threat that involves. co-
optation. Another merit of Selznick's treatment of cooptation is his 
recognition that it can have severe consequences for the power system. 
By no means does cooptation always result in the neutralization of the/ 
threat and increased freedom of action for the organization. Selznick 
(1949:262f and Chap. 3 and Chap. 4) shows that the cooptation by the TVA 
of rival agricultural leaders severely constrained its policy in this 
area. Conversely, he recognizes the use of cooptation as a control de-
vice in which the people do not actually exercise power. A related 
theme underlies Selznick's discussion of democratic planning and the TVA. 
The implication is that there exists a formal similarity between coopta-
tion and democracy in that they both involve the extension of participa-
tion. However, a main theme of Selznick's work is that cooptation tends 
to destroy democracy. On the one hand, cooptation of powerful threats 
(agri-business in the case of the TVA) may lead to acquiring a set of 
sectarian interests within the ranks of power to which capitulation may 
be necessary. Alternatively, 11 grass roots 11 citizen participation may 
appear to be a democratic maneuver while actually functioning as formal 
cooptation. 
There are several other intriguing ideas suggested by Selznick. 
One is the parallel between cooptation and ideology; both are defensive 
techniques used by an organization to adapt to its environment (Selznick, 
1949:259). Another is his connection of the type of threat faced by the 
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organization with the ensuing type of participation. This connection 
should be the task of a theory of cooptation, and it is begun by Selz-
nick's distinction between formal and informal cooptation. 
There are difficulties with his model which require furthe.r develop-
ment of the theory of cooptation. First, his model of a power system is 
poor. The choice of boundaries of the system is incorrect. When Selz-
nick speaks of the organization adapting to its environment, he implies 
that the boundaries of the system are to be drawn to include all members 
of the organization as the powerholder. The environment is made up of 
all actors and conditions.to which this organization must adapt. In my 
view, the system would include only the powerful members of the formal 
organization as the powerholder. For example, in the case of the TVA, 
one would include its officers, board of directors, etc. The civil sec-
tor would not directly correspond to Selznick's 11 environment 11 but would 
contain all actors over whom the powerholders nominally have control in 
the context of operations of the TVA. Unlike the environment, the civil 
sector would include the less powerful members of the organization it-
self; it would not contain superordinate organizations, such as the fed-
eral government, which in Selznick's model is part of the environment. 
In discussing cooptation, the relevant distinction is between the less 
powerful and the more powerful, rather than between an organization and 
its environment. It does not make sense to lump together as 11 environ-
ment11 actors with vast differentials in power. 
To see this clearly, we might take Selznick's organization/environ-
ment division to an absurd extreme. One would then say that the janitors 
and secretaries of the TVA, since they are a part of the organization, 
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help the organization meet threats to its power. Similarly, it would be 
absurd to think of the whole organization absorbing new leaders, or the 
whole organization being threatened by its environment. The 11 thing 11 
that absorbs and gets threatened is not the organization but the power-
holding segment of the organization. The TVA was not an anonymous organ-
ism finding its niche but an organization of real human beings, particu-
lar ones of whom exercised power. An anonymized view of power is the 
result of drawing the system boundaries as Selznick does. 
The use of a formal organizational perspective is the source of 
other .. problems with Selznick's model. It leads to the ignoring of the 
possible cooptation of threats within the system. Suppose a secretary 
in the TVA had discovered cooptation in the organization and was pro-
moted (coopted) to a more powerful position in the organization. Selz-
nick's model could not count this as cooptation since the threat is not 
part of the 11 environment. 11 In other words, Selznick's conception of 
threat is too restrictive, as it excludes internal threats which may be 
just as common as threats in the environment. He also had a deficient 
concept of threat, since it only includes two threats (a diffuse lack of 
legitimacy and specific alternative powerholders) out of a range of pos-
sible types of threat, as I have shown above. 
The use of the formal organization as the level of analysis is too 
restrictive. Cooptation is likely to have a different content, for exam-
ple, on the level of the nation-state. The more abstract vantage point 
of a power system avoids this problem. Selznick's statement of the forms 
that participation may take, namely absorption into leadership or policy-
determining, is also too narrow since there are other ways, such as ex-
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pansion of suffrage, in which a powerholder could increase participation 
and legitimacy. 
The biggest gap in Selznick's work is the lack of theoretical 
material on cooptation. He stretches what are literally a few pages on 
the definition of cooptation through hundreds of pages of substantive 
analysis and concludes without extending the theory but only providing 
empirical support for the formal/informal hypothesis. Thus, even if 
Selznick's model is satisfactory, there is still a .. need for the exten-
sion of the theory of cooptation. 
A contemporary variant of Selznick's model of cooptation emerges 
within the field of formal organization. In James Thompson's book (1967: 
35) on basic concepts of formal organization, he presents a definition 
taken word-for-word from Selznick and conceptualizes cooptation as a 
form of cooperation among organizations who are members of one another's 
environment and thus mutually dependent. Cooperation involves "the ex-
change of commitments ... [and] the reduction of potential uncertainty 
for both parties" (Thompson, 1967:35). In Thompson's view, cooptation 
represents a middle ground between contracting and coalition, which are 
the extremes of a continuum of cooperation, the dimension of which is 
the degree of constraint exercised by the cooperating parties upon one 
another. Allen (1974) produced an empirical study using this concept of 
cooptation and attempted to test some hypotheses proposed by Thompson. 
The specific hypotheses need not concern us here; what is interesting is 
the example of cooptation _he chooses, for it reveals something about the 
cooperation approach to cooptation. Allen examines interlocking among 
the boards of directors of corporations as a case of cooptation. This 
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example comes from Thompson (1967:35). The example highlights the dis-
tortion of the concept of cooptation which their approach brings about. 
It ceases to be a phenomenon peculiar to systems of power. In the cur-
rent author's view, systems of power involve two levels, that of the 
powerholder and that of the relatively powerless people. Cooptation in-
volves a relation between these two levels. In Allen's or Thompson's 
view, cooptation becomes a relationship between two actors of more or 
less equal power and thus could refer to processes between competing 
organizations. Systems of power involve one-way dependency, not the mu-
tual dependence implied by Thompson and Allen. If cooptation is a pheno-
menon of power it can not be a symmetrical relationship of cooperation. 
Since Selznick discusses cooptation within the context of power, it 
may seem curious that Thompson (and Allen, albeit indirectly) take him 
as a starting point. The explanation resides in their use of the organ-
ization adapting to its environment as their principle of analysis. One 
can understand how they arrive at their peculiar point of view: they 
must share Selznick's construction of the system boundaries as being be-
tween organization and environment, rather than between powerholder and 
people. Given this, a sharing of decision~making between an organization 
and its competitors in its environment could be viewed as cooperation and 
cooptation simultaneously. It is only because Selznick's model of coopt-
ation is separated from his organization-and-environment perspective that 
his model of cooptation is somewhat compatible with the threat model. 
Although Thompson cites Selznick's definition of cooptation, his model 
of cooptation flows more directly out of the organizational perspective 
than does Selznick's. Thompson's model is more consistent in this re-
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spect, but because of its reliance on a formal organization perspective, 
it is even less compatible with the threat model. 
Another treatment of cooptation is the power-protest model, repre-
sented by Gamson (1968), who cites Selznick's definition but treats the 
concept in a different way. He sees cooptation as a 11 control mechanism 11 
(i.e., a tool of the powerholder) which 11 involves yielding access [to the 
powerholder]_to the most difficult and threatening potential partisans 11 
(Gamson, 1968:135). The consequences of cooptation, according to Gamson, 
involve a trade-off: the powerholder gives up insulation of the parti-
san group as a technique in exchange for other controls possible once 
the partisans gain access to the powerholder. Once the partisans are 
actually participating in the legitimate system, new controls on• them 
are available to the powerholder (Gamson, 1968:135). They are subject 
to the rewards and punishments that are available in the legitimate sys-
tem, and they may acquire an interest in maintaining the system as it is. 
Gamson (1968:136) claims that 11 attitudinal changes 11 in the partisans are 
likely to result from their participation, with them becoming committed 
more to the system than to their original cause. In a later work, Garn-
son (1975) operationalizes cooptation and uses it in a different way. 
He defines cooptation in this .usage as a situation in which a dissident 
group becomes tamed. The group is accepted as a normal element in the 
system by the powerholder but fails to achieve the changes originally 
campaigned for (Gamson, 1975:29). The coopted group, in this definition, 
is one which has given up active protest in exchange for legitimate ac-
cess to the powerholder. This latter definition of Gamson 1 s does not 
correspond to his 1968 usage. What he has done here is to identify co-
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optation with one of its possible results, namely, the neutralization 
of a threatening group coupled with its continued existence as a group. 
This amounts to answering the question 11 What are the results of coopta-
tion?11 before it can be asked. He compounds his error by not only defin-
ing cooptation by its results but also by limiting it to one of its pos-
sible outcomes. 
Gamson 1 s 1968 model of cooptation is much more satisfactory. He 
uses cooptation within the context of a threatening interaction between 
powerholder and people. However, he seems to restrict cooptation to 
cases in which threat is severe and openly acknowledged. This is dif-
ferent from the threat model I propose, since Gamson would exclude 
threats such as the community of interest or the threat of apathy. The 
threat which has not yet manifested itself openly would also be excluded; 
this is an error, since the clever or forward-looking powerholder may 
wish to extend participation before the fact of open disaffection. This 
is clearly a cooptive maneuver, yet Gamson 1 s model would not include it. 
Spector and Kitsuse 1 s construction (1973) of the natural history of 
a social problem incidentally contains a power-protest model of coopta-
tion. They posit four stages through which social problems pass. The 
process begins with a dissident claiming that a certain condition is a 
social problem. Next comes official recognition by the government that 
a social problem exists, along with establishment of a government agency 
or process to deal with.it. The outcome of official recognition, ac-
dording to Spector and Kitsuse (1973:152), is that the group is invited 
to 11 participate in official proceedings on the problem. 11 Stark (1975:11) 
calls attention to the cooptive nature of this stage and refers to it as 
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"legitimation and cooptation. 11 
The process described here is directly parallel to my description 
of a threatening group being given participation within the official 
system. The social problem process as constructed by Spector and Kitsuse 
corresponds to the coopting of a manifest threat of the organized move-
ment variety. Spector and Kitsuse (1973:152) point concisely to the am-
biguous results of cooptation: "While official response may give ·the, 
protest group their finest hour, it may also represent the end of their 
control over the claims they raise. 11 The group may lose the ability to 
define its problem and 11.the responding agency may take over the issue, 
making it their own, and neutralize or eliminate the original protest 
group" (Spector and Kitsuse, 1973:153). Participation in the official 
system may lead to a bureaucratic filtering of the threat. 
There are further stages in the process of a social problem. As-
suming that the official solution is not satisfactory to the protesting 
group, a third stage arises in which there is renewed protest aimed now 
at the government's official remedy. Then, according to Spector and 
Kitsuse, a fourth stage ensues and cooptation may occur again. The 
group may decide that no solution exists within the traditional proce-
dures and institutions of the system and mount new threats in the form 
of alternative, non-official solutions to the problem (Spector and Kit-
suse, 1973:153). Here, they explicitly use the concept of cooptation 
for the first time in their article. If "successful and workable alter-
native institutions" are developed, "established institutions may at-
tempt to ... coopt [m. i.] the alternatives~ (Spector and Kitsuse, 
1973:157). What they talk about here would be, in my terminology, co-
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opting the leaders of an organized threat to the public sector. Spector 
and Kitsuse (1973:157) go on to explain how this cooptation might be ac-
complished, in other words, how increased participation might be given 
to the threatening actors. This might be done by making "attractive of-
fers" to the leaders and experts of the social problem groups. The gov-
ernment might, in the case of alternative schools, invite their leaders 
to participate in confer~nces or extend grants for the study of alterna-
tive schools. The government would then gain control over the groups by 
separating the dissident leaders from their people. The government may 
be able to gain legitimacy by claiming the.innovations as its own. 
Spector and Kitsuse (1973:157) insightfully note that this need not be 
viewed negatively by the protest group. It depends on whether their 
goal was to establish a new institution for the society as a whole, in 
which case they would approve cooptation, or whether they were oriented 
to defending their groups• specific interest, in which case they would 
disapprove the government takeover. 
Spector and Kits use I s model has no conflict with the threat model. 
Although they speak about social problems:, the way they conceptualize 
them as involving a threatening cycle of interaction between a state and 
a protest group makes it applicable to cooptation as well. However, 
there is an incompleteness to their discussion. They commit the typical 
error of construing threat too narrowly. The threat they consider, a 
social problems protest group, is only one of several possible types of 
threat suggested in the threat model. 
Now let us consider two representatives of a fourth type, the poli-
tical-socialization model. Greer and Orleans (1964) present such a 
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model. In their view, cooptation refers to "the mechanisms of commit-
ting necessary subgroups to the dominant group and ongoing enterprise" 
(1964:831). This does not refer to cooptation as a process of change in 
the composition in the leadership of a power system or to the extension 
of participation to dissidents, as do other models. Cooptation in Greer 
and Orleans• usage could indicate any of the techniques that powerhold-
ers use to unify their systems and deal with resistance. Thus, it could 
include such phenomena as ideology, cooptation in the sense I have used 
it, showy public ceremonies, or the adoption of new laws favoring cer-
tain segments of the people. Cooptation would include all kinds of 
yielding procedures. This is excessively inclusive. 
Domhoff (1967) has a similar concept of cooptation. He briefly 
notes that Greer and Orleans• concept is like his own (Domhoff, 1967: 
158). He defines cooptation as a "process whereby individuals are assi-
milated and committed to the institutions and values of the dominant so-
cioeconomic group" (Domhoff, 1967:5). This, as in Greer and Orleans, re-
fers to a process of socializing the civil sector into accepting the 
legitimacy of the power system. While cooptation serves the purpose of 
increasing legitimacy, Domhoff 1 s definition of it again could include a 
fantastic array of other techniques. He further confuses the issue by 
speaking of (e.g.) elite law schools in the U.S. as coopting mechanisms, 
in that they serve as a source of members for the dominant group. Here 
he uses an elite recruitment model in which 11 friendlies 11 advance in a 
hierarchy. The dimension of threat is obscured, unless one assumes that 
the law school students were a threat to the legal order prior to their 
law school political socialization. 
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We can now see the differences and advantages of the threat model. 
It makes threat a defining element of cooptation, whereas in previous 
models it was implicit or unanalyzed. The idea of threat is the thread 
which connects all concepts of cooptation. In the traditional or elite 
recruitment model the cooptive type of recruitment would not be necessary 
unless the powerholders were threatened by possible changes in their 
midst. In the power-protest model, and in Selznick 1 s formal organization 
model, specific types of threat lead to cooptation, but the range of 
threats considered is too, narrow. In the cooperation variant of the 
formal organization model, threat is represented by the notion of the un-
certainty of elements in the environment. The political socialization 
model implies the existence of threat, since it considers the needs of a 
dominant group in dealing with the subgroups and tndividuals which con-
front it. In fact, whenever one speaks of power, threat is implied. All 
modes of power, from legitimate to coercive, contain the idea of someone 
controlling others. Since control might break down, there is always the 
element of threat. Thus, to say that cooptation takes place in a power 
system is to say that it involves threats. A model of cooptation must 
therefore have explicit reference to threat. 
Having emphasized the notion of threat, the proposed model achieves 
greater conceptual accuracy by recognizing the existence of a variety of 
types of threat. Also, the threat model achieves greater clarity and 
accuracy by defining a process which is inclusive enough to be theoreti-
cally interesting (in contrast to the traditional model) yet not so broad 
as to be conceptually useless (as in the political socialization model). 
The choice of a power system as the unit of analysis also helps here, as 
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it is a theoretical vantage point which is sufficiently abstract but 
theoretically well-defined and meaningful. Another contribution of 
this model of cooptation is the identification of two kinds of success-
ful outcomes, the filtering and legitimacy payoffs. Finally, this re-
formulation of cooptation should hopefully serve as a framework with 
which one can recognize, give form to, and analyze the everyday sub-
stance of power systems. 
ENDNOTES 
lr have no intention of suggesting that social systems can be 
treated in the manner of physical systems. This is only an illustra-
tive reference. 
2selznick's earlier article (1948) also treats cooptation, but his 
book expands and clarifies the same material. There are no conflicts 
between the two presentations. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE CASE OF AMERICAN INDIANS 
Before beginning the description and analysis of an example of co-
optation, let us recall a few of the central concepts of the threat 
model. Cooptation will refer to extensions of political participation 
to actors {persons or organizations) who pose a threat to the state. 
Threats refer to resistance by members of the civil sector. Cooptation 
is also characterized by opposition and intention. There must be an ex-
pansion of participation, initiated or at least directed by the power-
holder, to actors who hold power separate from and in opposition to 
that provided by the official system, and it must be plausible to impute 
an opposition of interest between the powerholder and the dissident. 
The terms 11 legitimacy payoff 11 and 11 filtering payoff" denote two possible 
results of cooptation, which, from the standpoint of the powerholder are 
successful outcomes, since they refer to the enhancement and preserva-
tion of control over resistance, despite the apparent weakening of con-
trol involved in the extension of political participation. 
Political History of American Indians 
The example of cooptation to' be considered took place between the 
United States government and American Indians. Specific expansions of 
participation (i.e., cooptation) occurred during the 1960 1s and 1970 1 s, 
but the background of these events as well as other instances of coopta-




The structural position of the Indian in the U.S. was first that of 
a member of a tribe, an independent, relatively sovereign group which 
the colonizing American system confronted as an obstacle. In.its deal-
ings with tribes, the American government pursued until 1871 a basic 
policy of treaty-making with individual tribes; although this practice 
may have rarely been one of free contracts between equals, and was of-
ten prefaced by war, it nevertheless indicates something about the posi-
tion of the Indian up until then. He appeared to the government not as 
a recalcitrant citizen, but as a member of what was an alien nation 
within the expanding American system. 
One of the government's early policy innovations was the reserva-
tion system, which began in the middle 1800 1 s (see Tyler, 1973:70-73 et 
seq.). The rationale for the placement of Indians on reservations was 
to isolate the Indians, keep them peaceful, and open up more lands for 
settlers. The government allowed the tribes, on the reservations, to 
manage their own internal affairs, thus maintaining up through the 1860 1 s 
a policy of dealing 11with Indian tribes largely as self-governing units. 11 
(Tyl er, 1973: 91) 
Starting around 1870, the thrust of the U.S. government's policy 
was directly toward assimilating ·the Indians into the American system, 
instead of dealing with them as members of separate nations within the 
nation. As Tyler (1973:124) says, the 11 long range goals set by the gov-
ernment for the Indians [were] assimilation and 1civilization 1 • 11 There 
are several indications of the impetus toward assimilation, one being 
the 1885 extension of federal criminal jurisdiction to Indian territor-
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ies, at least for certain crimes (Tyler, 1973:91). In another act indi-
cative of the trend toward assimilation rather than pluralism, Congress 
in 1871 forbade further treaty making between the government and the 
Indians (Tyler, 1973:91). Another facet of the new direction in policy 
was the Dawes Act of 1887. It established the allotment system, a plan 
in which the government deeded land to individual Indians rather than to 
the traditional tribal or community structures (Tyler, 1973:95). The 
C 
allotment plan, in its attempt to persuade Indians to become freeholding 
individual farmers, particularly aimed at assimilation of the Indian 
into white civilization. Furthermore, it was easier for whites to ac-
quire lands that were owned by individual Indians rather than tribes 
(Tyler, 1973:96). Generally, the trend of government Indian policy dur-
c 
ing the 1870 1 s and 1880 1 s was to 0 
further minimize the functions of tribal leaders and tribal in-
stitutions and to continually strengthen the position of the gov-
ernment representative and his subordinates, and to improve 
the effectiveness of their programs to break down traditional 
patterns within the Indian communities. (Tyler, 1973:91) 
The Indian's relationship with the government was becoming more that of 
an individual quasi-citizen, a change from his previo~s position as a 
member of a sovereign alien group, the tribe. In 1924, President Cool-
idge signed a bill which gave citizenship to all Indians, although nearly 
two-thirds already were such (Tyi'er, 1973:110). The citizenship decree 
can be viewed as an attempt at political assimilation; the cultural as-
similation of the allotment policy had failed to make good American farm-
ers out of the Indians. 
· In 1933, John Collier, who had a personal history as a worker for 
reform of Indian policy, became Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the 
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government. He took a stand against assimilation by supporting the right 
of Indians to exercise their traditional cultural practices, such as lan-
guage, crafts, and religion. (Tyler, 1973:128) Collier first began the 
explicit practice (known as Indian Preference) of bringing Indians into 
the government's Indian Service; by 1934, one-third of the classified 
employees in the service were Indians (Tyler, 1973:128). He also was a 
chief force behind the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, a piece of 
legislation that reversed.the policy of breaking up tribal landholdings 
and governments by giving more self-government to tribes. It also es-
tablished the policy of giving preference to Indians in consideration 
for employment in the Indian Service (Fey and McNickle, 1970:111-112). 
Another feature of this bill was its provision for a series of Indian 
congresses around the country at which Indians could give their opinions 
on its provisions and vote whether or not it would be applied to their 
tribes (Tyl er, 1973: 129). .one pro bl em with this act, as expressed by 
the Indian Rights Association at the time, was its treatment of all 
tribes as being alike (Tyler, 1973:131). During this period of tribal 
reorganization, the government's policy seems to have wavered between 
two tendencies, that of assimilation, exemplified by the cooptation of 
Indians into the Indian Service through Indian Preference and the Indi-
an Reorganization Act's inattention to cultural differences among tribes, 
and that of pluralism, represented by Collier's defense of traditional 
cultural practices and the self-government provisions of the Reorganiza-
tion Act. However, Tyler (1973:151-152) argues that the Reorganization 
Act's revitalization of the tribal organization was only a new technique 
in the long term policy of assimilation. The hope was that Indians 
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might be assimilated by treating tribes more like other local political 
communities. 
The next change in government policy came in the late 1940 1 s and 
1950 1 s. The policy of termination began, which meant that tribes that 
were prosperous and deemed capable of managing their own affairs would 
be terminated from their special status in relations with the government. 
Indians in these tribes would no longer receive special services, privi-
leges, and monies as Indians, but would be dealt with as private citi-
zens. Termination met with strong resistance from even the more cautious 
Indians and their supporters. (Tyler, 1973:175) According to Cahn and 
Hearne (1970:16), 11 [f]ear of termination pervades Indian thinking. It 
colors. the Indian's appraisal of every proposal, suggestion, and criti-
cism.11 Members of tribes that were terminated (e.g., Menominee and Kla-
math) did not fare well economically. Consequently, fear of termination 
has led to Indian support for the Bureau of Indian Affairs as the lesser 
of evils. While Indians may dislike intensely the paternalism, bureau-
cracy, and coercion of the,BIA, they:often view it as better than no pro-
tection at all (Cahn and Hearne, 1970:22-23). By the beginning of the 
1960 1 s, termination (and the notion of assimilation which underlay it) 
had subsided as the overt policy of the government (Tyler, 1973:186), 
but Cahn and Hearne (1970:20-21) claim it remained as an ultimate ob-
jective behind the strategies of government Indian policy. 
The NCIO and the BIA .i!!. Depth 
Starting in 1968 during the Johnson administration, the most clear 
cases of cooptation began. The government started a policy that Tyler 
(1973:217) calls 11 self-determination through Indian leadership, 11 but 
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which I view as the expansion of legitimate participation to a threaten-
ing group. In 1968 Lyndon Johnson initiated this era with the creation 
of the National Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO). In a Special Mes-
sage to Congress, Johnson (1968:440) said: In order to 11 launch an undi-
vided government effort in this area [of Indian problems], I am issuing 
an Executive Order to establish a National Council on Indian Opportun~ 
ity. 11 He stipulated that members of this council were to be the cabinet 
department secretaries of Interior; Agriculture; Commerce; Labor; Health, 
Education and Welfare; Housing and Urban Development; the director of the 
Office of Economic Opportunity; the vice-president as chair; and six 
Indian leaders to be appointed by the president. The council 1s purpose 
and mandate was 11 to review Federal programs for Indians, make broad 
policy recommendations, and ensure that programs reflect the needs and 
desires of the Indian people 11 (Johnson, 1968:440). The NCIO is a case 
of cooptation in the strict sense used here. 
On 26 January 1970, during the Nixon administration, the Indian 
members of the NCIO made a statement, which Josephy (1971:204) sees as 
a reaction to the failure of the Nixon regime to act on Indian policy. 
In this statement, the Indian members of the council (NCIO, 1970:205) 
demonstrated some awareness of the potential justificatory functions of 
the NCIO; they alluded to the 11 symbolic importance 11 of their participa-
tion, and claimed that their meeting with the vice-president and cabinet 
members would tend to 11 alleviate some of the cynicism and despair rife 
among 11 Indians. Beyond this, they (NCIO, 1970:205) argued that action 
and commitments by Federal members of the council were necessary if con-
tinued 11 suspicion 11 and 11 distrust 11 of the government were to cease among 
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Indians. They gave a series of concrete suggestions; some of these 
called for the establishment of special positions for Indians in cabinet 
departments, and others concerned education, economics, urban Indians, 
legal services, land rights, housing, and agriculture. In a Special 
Message to Congress on 8 July 1970, Nixon made a series of legislative 
recommendations that attended to nearly all of the suggestions made £l_ 
the NCIO. Nixon suggested the following: 
(1) a new Concurrent Resolution that would 11 renounce, re-
pudiate and repeal the termination policy ... 11 , 
(2) support for voluntary Indian control of Indian pro-
grams with the necessary technical assistance from the Govern-
ment to facilitate transfers of responsibilities, 
(3) restoration of the sacred lands near Blue Lake, New 
Mexico, .... , 
(4) recognition of the right of and support for Indian com-
munities to take over Indian schools ... , 
(5) economic development legislation ... , 
(6) additional appropriations to improve health programs 
for Indians, 
(7) strengthening of efforts of Government agencies to 
deliver services needed to assist Indians living in urban 
centers, and 
(8) the establishment of an Indian Trust Counsel Authority 
11 to assure independent legal representation for the Indians' 
natural resource rights ... 11 The President also asked the 
Congress for the New Assistant Secretary for Indian and Terri-
torial Affairs ... (Tyler, 1973:221-222) 
These recommendations were almost exactly what the Indian members of the 
NCIO had asked for in their statement of January, 1970. The fate of 
this legislation will be considered below. 
Nixon shortly afterward expanded the NCIO and at least verbally al-
tered its purpose from what it had been under Johnson. On 31 August 
1970, Nixon (1970:1132) announced the appointment of eight·new Indian 
leaders to the NCIO, thereby replacing former members whose terms had 
expired and adding two additional Indian members. The council continued 
38 
under the chairmanship of the vice-president, retained the cabinet heads 
as before, and added the Attorney General. The NCIO was now mandated to 
encourage 
full use of Federal programs to benefit the Indian population 
•.. , encourage interagency coordination and cooperation in 
carrying out Federal programs for Indians ... , [and] suggest 
ways to improve such programs. (Nixon, 1970:1132) 
The tone of Nixon's mandate for the NCIO might be interpreted as having 
indicated a change toward less authority for the NCIO, as compared to 
Johnson's statement. Nixon's use of "appraise, encourage, and suggest" 
implies a less authoritative position than Johnson's "review, recommend, 
and ensure. 11 This may be a hint of Nixon's possible interest in the 
legitimizing and justifying functions of a cooptive organ such as the 
NCIO. However, his adoption of their legislative program contradicts 
the tone of his statement. 
Some of the activities of the NCIO can be explored. In one of 
their first actions after Nixon's appointments, the Indian members of 
the council traveled around the U.S. with the president's Indian legis-
lative proposals and met with Indian leaders to solicit opinions and 
suggestions from them (Tyler, 1973:221). Reaction gained at these meet-
ings was mixed. According to Tyler (1973:222), there was considerable 
praise for the "'intent' of the l_egislative proposals," but there was 
some skepticism about their outcome. A typical response was: "We've 
heard this kind of thing before; now we'll sit back and wait to see the 
results." (Tyler, 1973:222). 
Their skepticism was well founded,~ Congress failed to act on 
much of the legislation, other than the section dealing with the rester-
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ation of sacred.lands at Blue Lake. Tyler (1973:255) says that some 
scholars attribute the legislation's failure to pass to the "actual 
priority given this legislation by the Nixon administration," others 
point to the conflicts among congressional committees about the use of 
lands and resources, and others claim that the legislative package had 
little strong support among Indians and that this discouraged action by 
Congress. Whatever the reason, little of the proposed legislation be-
·came law. 
Another view bearing on the efficacy of the NCIO comes from Alvin 
Josephy (1971:204), who notes that Indians, at least prior to 1970, had 
"mixed feelings" about the council, with many believing it was "another 
government bureaucracy controlled by white officials and 'rubber 
stamped' by its Indian members, who would be unable to accomplish any-
thing significant." Other Indians, such as some tribal officials, felt 
that the NCIO was sympathetic to their problems, and Josephy himself 
(1971) thinks that the NCIO was in a position to influence federal agen-
cies and policy. 
Josephy (1971:204) gives a list of the Indian members of NCIO under 
Nixon. Their backgrounds are revealing: seven were tribal officials, 
one was also a state legislator, and one (LaDonna Harris) was the wife 
of a U.S. senator. These people may have been staunch Indian advocates, 
but their backgrounds do· not type them as radicals. They were experi-
enced participants in established forms of the official political pro-
cess. 
There were other expansions of participation (cooptation) under 
Nixon. In 1970 and 1971, 11 the Indian desk concept, 11 i.e., the creation 
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of positions for Indians in cabinet departments, .was put into practice; 
this had been advocated by the NCI0 in their previously mentioned 1970 
statement. The policy of Indian preference in the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs established under Collier's leadership in the 1930 1 s was reaf-
firmed and expanded during the Nixon administration. Previously, 
qualified persons of at least one-fourth degree or more Indian 
blood had been given preference for employment opportunities 
in the BIA, but a 1971 BIA study found that this policy had 
only been applied in the case of 11 initial employment and rein-
statement •.. [and] not in the case of training opportunities 
or promotion 11 (Tyler, 1973:225). 
In September, 1971, Commissioner Bruce of the BIA recommended the exten-
sion of Indian preference to all BIA employment situations, and in June 
of 1972 the Interior Secretary approved the change. A final instance of 
cooptation in the BIA is indicated by the backgrounds of the commission-
ers under Johnson and Nixon. Both of them (Robert Bennet and Louis 
Bruce) were Indians themselves. 
At this point, let us look at the quality of Indian political parti-
cipation in the BIA. Tyler (1973:225) claims that more than 50 percent 
of BIA employees were Indian at the time of his writing, including 11 many 
of the top officials, 11 but he admits that a 11 much smaller though stead.:. 
ily increasing percentage 11 were in the higher level positions. Cahn and 
Hearne (1970:129) quote an Indian. as seeing the BIA as. 11 skimming off the 
top of the potJntial Indian leadership by incorporating 'good' Indians 
into the system: 'The educated Cherokee who knows he is a Cherokee tries 
to help his people and immediately he is stopped and loses his job. 111 
That some Indians view BIA participation by Indians as cooptation in the 
pejorative sense can be seen in the following statement by Mildred 
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Ballenger, an Indian tribal official: "The potential leaders of our 
tribe really have but about two choices: .. [to leave the Indian 
community for employment elsewhere], or join the white-oriented group 
[m.i.] by getting a job with the Indian Bureau ... "(Ballenger, quoted 
in Cahn and Hearne, 1970:128). This suggests that Indian participants 
in the official government process (within the BIA in particular), while 
they are representatives of a threatening group, are actually drawn from 
those members of the threatening group likely to be sympathetic and 
friendly to the government viewpoint. The composition of the NCIO, 
which was discussed above, demonstrates the same: the people selected 
are relatively assimilated to the American political system, as shown by 
their previous experience in state-sanctioned political organs. 
Another factor bearing on the significance of Indian participation 
in the BIA is its position within the state's administrative structure. 
The Bureau is not situated so as to effectively help and/or represent 
Indians. Being in the Department of the Interior is one of the BIA's 
chief liabilities, from the perspective of the Indians. Cahn and Hearne 
(1970:158) point to the Interior Department's amicable connections with 
natural resource business interests. They also mention other bureaus 
housed within Interior, such as the Bureau of Mines and the Bureau of 
Land Management. Cahn and Hearne (1970:158) cite several instances in 
which agencies have fought against specific Indian interests, and they 
claim that within the Department of the Interior the wishes of the BIA 
usually lose out to others. Even Tyler (1973:254), in his history pub-
lished by the BIA, admits that there is an inherent "conflict of inter-
est" within the Department of the Interior due to its role in land and 
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natural resource policy as well as its role in representing Indians. 
The Secretary of the Interior, under whom the BIA commissioner and oper-
atives must serve, cannot be exclusively supportive of Indian interests. 
According to Cahn and Hearne (1973:160), the Interior Secretary must 
primarily deal with questions of resource use, and that Indian "culture, 
human welfare ... , self-determination and sovereignty are given less 
weight in a search for the best use of land and natural resources." The 
Interior Secretary, whatever his own views, must live in a world of 
realpolitik. The Indian and the BIA have little political influence as 
compared to others with whom the secretary must interact, and some of 
the influential others (within the Bureau of the Budget in particular) 
are not at all supportive of the Indian cause (Cahn and Hearne, 1970: 
161). Other writers also say that the Bureau of the Budget has caused 
problems for the BIA. Donnely (1972:445) tells of a case in which the 
federal government's budget office set a limit on BIA expenditures, yet 
at the same time expected them to pay for a new and expensive highway 
program. The BIA as an organization is not located in a position to 
have much influence on policy. Its residence within the Interior Depart-
ment, an organization having other commitments, other powerful influ-
ences, and numerous conflicts of interest, enervates the BIA's potential 
to help Indians. The point~ this: Even if Indians completely con-
trolled the BIA, they could not adequately represent Indian interests 
because of the structural position of the Bureau. 
Alvin Josephy (1969:122) believes that the BIA must be relocated 
within the government, preferably to a position directly under the pres-
ident. But he also criticizes another problem with the BIA, namely its 
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inefficiency as an organization. Citing a study by Leon Ovsiew (n.d., 
n.p.), Josephy (1969:128-129) indicts the BIA for having a structure 
which impedes change. Specifically, any innovation suggested by a local 
BIA operative on a reservation must be approved by a host of higher-level 
personnel within the BIA. The administrative practices of the BIA thus 
de-emphasize and excessively subordinate action by local Indians and 
local BIA personnel. The emphasis is on 11 echelons of administrators and 
absentee specialists higher up 11 (Josephy, 1969:129). Josephy (1969:131) 
further argues that the Bureau contains many people who could and would 
act to serve Indians, but~the organization of the BIA prevents them 
from doing so; therefore, he believes that Indians' criticism of BIA em-
ployees is more accurately thought of as criticism of a 11 structure which 
binds and frustrates its personnel. 11 
Form and Substance of the Indian Threat 
This ends the description of the cooptation of American Indians. 
Now it can be analyzed from the point of view of the threat model of co-
optation. The purpose is not to validate the model using an empiricist 
criterion of verification. The goal is to illustrate how the concepts 
and themes of the model might be used and to let the example be sugges-
tive of new ideas. 
Using the model of a power system outlined above, American Indians 
would be classified as actors within the civil sector, with the American 
government (including the President, Congress, cabinet departments, Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs, etc.) as the state. The first question concerns 
what type of threat the Indian was to the state. Historically, American 
Indians posed the threat of being subjects in the process of being en-
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closed by a new power system which had not previously ruled them. Indi-
ans are a polar case here, since they were not for some time even citi-
zens of the new American system but were instead members of alien sys-
tems (tribes) dwelling within the same geographic territory as that 
covered by the Americans. Since conflicts took place over land, the 
tribes were a threat to the powerholder who had an interest in opening 
land to citizens of his own system. As the Indians lost their land, 
were moved onto reservations, were split up by the Allotment policy, and 
became citizens of the U.S., the tribal unit ceased to be the only 
source of threat. Contemporary Indians confront the state as individual 
citizens, as members of a tribe, and in some cases (e.g.; the American 
Indian Movement, the National Congress of American Indians) as members 
of protest organizations. Considered as citizens, they threaten the 
state as members of a community of interest. As members of a tribe, 
they exemplify the threat of actors who are new members of the civil 
sector and who do not necessarily view the powerholder as legitimate. 
Tribes are also a threat in their status as organizations of opposition 
within the system that are power systems themselves. As members of pro-
test organizations, they are again part of an organized opposition to 
the powerholder. Thus, several of the types of threat mentioned in 
Chapter I are characteristic of American Indians. 
Although the preceding discussion treated the formal aspect of In-
dians as a threat, a consideration of the content of their threat is 
also necessary. The most important substantive aspect of the Indian 
threat derives from the state 1 s commitment to 11 fair-play 11 , to democratic 
self-determination.and to legal-rational norms of conduct in governing 
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its subjects. When Indians are denied legally sanctioned rights, the 
state can be trapped by its own ideology of democracy. When Indians 
raise objection to their treatment, American ideology can be called into 
question if the government does not give at least the appearance of ad-
hering to its norms of procedure. 
It is the government's ideological and to some extent actual com-
mitment to le~al-rational procedure that has made possible the Indian 
as a legal threat. Indians have long used the courts of the United 
States to pursue, with some success, their various interests and legally 
guaranteed (e.g., treaty) rights. One might begin with the lawsuit 
filed against the State of Georgia in the 1830's by the Cherokee, who 
argued in the Supreme Court that the laws of Georgia were not applicable 
to them, thereby attempting to defend their political sovereignty (De-
loria, 1974:8). Although the court refused the Cherokee's right to sue 
in this case (Cherokee Nation Y.2..· The State of Georgia, 1831), in 1832 a 
Christian missionary to the Cherokee raised the same issue by deliberate-
ly disobeying Georgia law while on the reservation. When he appealed 
his conviction to the Supreme Court of the United States, the court ruled 
that Georgia laws were not applicable on the reservation, as the Cherokee 
had a degree of sovereignty acknowledged in their treaties with the 
United States, which recognized the tribe as a power with sufficient 
sovereignty to treat with the United States {Worcester Y.2..· The State of 
Georgi a, 1832). However, even a cursory acquaintance with American In-
di an history would show that the principles embodied in these decisions 
have not been honored or enforced. The significance of these cases is: 
(l) that they are early examples of the Indian's use of the courts as a 
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technique of resistance and hence an early display of their ability to 
mount a legal threat; and (2) that these decisions established a legal 
recognition of Indian tribes as alien sovereign nations, albeit depend-
ent ones, existing within the power system of the United States. As 
indicated in the previous discussion, the government in practice at-
tempted to avoid treating Indians as members of tribal nations (at least 
after 1871) and tried to assimilate them politically and culturally. 
Nevertheless, the legal precedents articulated in these decisions remain 
rarely honored, but as a potential basis on which Indians, given a legal-
rational political system, could resist the state. 
Other important legal cases came about in the l850's when tribes 
sued for damages claiming breach of treaty rights when lands were taken 
by the state. The government created a Court of Claims in 1854 to handle 
these and similar cases, but tribal suits became such a problem that the 
government later acted to exclude them from the jurisdiction of the 
court except when exclusively permitted by Congress on a case-by-case 
basis (Deloria, 1974:209-210). Another important case took place in the 
late 1800's when Indians in Oregon and Washington sued to protect fish~ 
ing rights guaranteed by treaty, but which had been encroached upon by 
commercial fishing. Eventually, a suit came to the Supreme Court; Indi-
an treaty rights were upheld (Deloria, 1974:14-15). The seriousness of 
the threat constituted by the Indians' recovery of their fishing rights 
was demonstrated by the fact that, as recently as 1965, local white of-
ficials used police force as well as the courts in attempts to limit 
these rights (Cahn and Hearne, 1970:76-77). 
The Congress passed a bill in 1924 that strengthened Indians' titles 
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to their lands. Through a series of lawsuits based on this legislation, 
the Pueblos Indians successfully evicted 3~000 whites from their lands 
during the 1920 1 s and 1930 1 s. Their victory helped popularize litiga-
tion as a tool for the preservation of Indian rights and for the publi-
cizing of Indian problems (Deloria, 1974:17). 
Litigation has intensified since then, wtth suits being far too 
numerous to cover completely. In the United States vs. Shoshone Tribe 
in 1938, Indian land titles were further strengthened with the recogni-
tion that Indians had title to 11 all elements of value 11 from their land, 
regardless of whether the government had formally recognized such title 
(Deloria, 1974:108). This provided a further theoretical basis for In-
dian litigation. A new concrete structure for the processing of Indian 
lawsuits over land came about in 1946, at which time the federal govern-
ment created a special Indians Claims Commission to deal with cases in-
volving treaty rights. Another basis of Indian litigation is the trus-
tee status of Indian assets. Under this principle, the BIA must see 
that Indian natural and financial resources are properly used. With 
this 11 overly protective stance,i• the government has placed itself in a 
position of financial liability, and the courts have forced the govern-
ment to pay over $100 million to tribes for damages (Deloria, 1974:158). 
As of Deloria 1 s writing (1974:253), some 100 suits brought by Indian 
tribes were pending against U.S. federal employees and agencies for 
misuses of funds. 
The point to be gleaned from this recitation of Indians• theoreti-
cal and actual chances to sue is not that their legal rights are ade-
quately defended through these means. Rather, it is only that, within a 
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formally democratic (i.e., legal-rational) political system, the exist-
ence.of such legal precedents and structures means that Indians are a 
continual legal threat. Secondly, they have frequently taken advantage 
of these chances through actual legal action. Whether they win cases or 
not, Indians can create trouble and expense for the government. They 
can create disruption through these suits, when, for example, the gov-:-
ernment must mediate between the legal claims of ~ndians and the demands 
of powerful non-Indians. In a situation like the current one in the 
State of Maine, the federal government is in the unenviable position of 
balancing what are probable legally justified claims of Indians to large 
portions of the state against the demands of white owners of the land, 
who in numbers and economic resources are more influential than .the In-
dians (see Akwesasne Notes, 1977). Furthermore, if the government re-
cognizes the legitimacy of Indian claims but declines to honor them for 
(sometimes openJy) admitted pragmatic reasons, it must violate the Amer-
ican ideological tradition of the sanctity and stability of legal-ration-
al procedure. The Indians can trap the state in its own ideology, thus 
potentially precipitating a loss of legitimacy. 
Some examples of Indian lawsuits to defend rights guaranteed by 
treaty or other agreement will illustrate the consequences of the legal 
threat of the Indian. Blumenthal· (1955:165-166) presents one such case: 
The Sioux sued the United States in 1923 seeking compensation for lands 
taken from them after gold was discovered on their lands in 1874. A 
previous treaty of 1869 provided that the Sioux were to have complete 
possession and control of the land allotted to them in the treaty. It 
further stipulated that none of the land could be given or taken away 
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without consent of three-quarters of the male members of the tribe. The 
United States Court of Claims agreed with the Sioux's version of the 
facts, but claimed that there was legal precedent for the government's 
action in taking away the land. The court further ruled that the gov-
ernment had acted for the good of the Indian! (Blumenthal, 1955:166). 
The Sioux were therefore unable to recover any compensation for their 
land. This illustrates a situation in which the government, while not 
losing anything financially, responded with a court decision that openly 
ignored treaty guarantees--a curious and potentially dangerous response 
for a government that ideologically upholds the sanctity of contracts. 
In a more successful case (Blumenthal, 1955:167), the Indian Claims 
Commission in 1951 awarded the Kaw Indians some $2.5 million, ruling 
that the payment for Kaw lands in an 1846 treaty was too low. In 1952, 
the Utes were paid $13 million for lands taken from them by force in the 
1800's (Blumenthal, 1955:175). In another spectacular suit, the Semi-
nole Tribe of Oklahoma and Florida sued before the Indian Claims Commis-
sion to recover damages for treaty violation. The Seminoles, the abori-
ginal inhabitants of Florida, were given title to some 80 percent of the 
state by a treaty of 1823 (Gaillard, 1970:146). The federal government, 
during the next 20 years, ignored this treaty and finally via military 
action forced the Indians off their land. The Seminoles' 1964 suit be-
fore the Claims Commission eventually succeeded, and it awarded them $12 
million in 1970 (Frye, 1970:47). Many similar cases have appeared be-
fore the Indian Claims Commission. Awards to Indian tribes by the Com-
mission have totalled a half billion dollars over the last 30 years, 
with the largest successful claim being a $35 million award to the Kiowa, 
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Commanche, and Apache in 1975 (Indian Claims Commission, 1975). These· 
several cases illustrate the consequences and extent of the violation of 
Indian land rights. They are examples of possible outcomes of the Indi-
an legal threat based on the various legal precedents outlined above. 
There are two other aspects of the Indian threat; one is the econo-
mic exploitation of Indians, and the other is the rise of Indian protest 
organizations in the 1960's. Economic exploitation refers to the cola~· 
nial situation in which Indians find themselves. Even when they tech-
nically own their lands, they frequently lose the profits from it to 
outsiders. On the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota, for example, 
Indian farmers and ranchers use less than one percent of the land, while 
non-Indians farm over 50 percent, thereby realizing "substantial pro-
fits'' (Cahn and Hearne, 1970:82). Of the $170 million earned through 
agriculture on Indian reservations in 1968, only about one-third went to 
the Indians themselves (Schusky, 1970:vi). In 1967, minerals (including 
oil) on reservations brought $31 million to Indian tribes; at the same 
time, large corporations earned billions from minerals on Indian proper-
ties (Schusky, 1970:vii). The economic exploitation of the Indian has 
as its consequences the well-known low per capita income of Indians, 
the high rate of infant mortality, low life expectancy, and so forth. 
The profitability of Indian lands, coupled with Indians' relative exclu-
sion from these benefits further contribute to the Indian threat, if one 
assumes that this exploitation can be maintained only through the power 
of law backed by the potential use of force. Such exploitation may also 
make Indians an object of sympathy of other liberal and radical elements, 
as well as radicalizing the Indians themselves. 
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Precisely this happened in the 1960 1 s. Deloria (1974:2) mentions 
the desires of radical groups in the 1960 1 s to include the Indians as 
another exploited minority within their united front, a move that met 
with rather mixed reaction among Indians, who saw themselves as members 
of alien nations, not as oppressed citizens within the United States. 
The Indians did, however, come to adopt protest tactics in the 1960 1 s, 
using public demonstrations as a means to dramatize their situation. 
The tribal leaders were able to play off the protest groups against the 
government; they could gain concessions by presenting less radical de-
mands than did the younger and less traditional Indians in.protest 
groups (Deloria, 1974:28). Urban Indians living off the reservation 
formed protest organizations such as·the American Indian Movement (AIM). 
Some 100 Indians participated in the Poor People's March on Washington 
in 1968 (Deloria, 1974:33). In general then, the 1960's saw an increase 
in Indian protest movements that cooperated to some extent among them-
selves and with other dissidents. 
The prime source of the Indian threat has been, and continues to be, 
that of litigation. This, .together with economic exploitation and pro-
test organizations, has been the content of the Indian threat. This is 
the general background of threat to which the state had to adapt, and as 
such, is the key factor underlying the cooptation of Indians. 
As well as being a threat, Indians as a group have other character-
istics that are necessary if their participation in the American system 
is to be viewed as cooptation. One can impute opposition between Indi-
ans and the government. Tribes were and are (to a limited extent) sys-
tems possessing power separate from that of the legitimate system, and 
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Indians have interests in controlling their land which oppose those of 
the government in its attempt to give possession and use of the land to 
other persons and organizations. All of the instances of cooptation to 
be analyzed below were intentional (see Chapter I for the importance of 
this): the state specifically encouraged participation by Indians and 
created structures and practices to allow it. The cooptation of Ameri-
can 1ndians has the background of threat, opposition, and intention that 
are necessary if a process is to be viewed as cooptation. 
Discussion of Indian Cooptation 
Here are the specific instances of cooptation in the history of the 
American Indian. The first of these was the allowing of Indians to be-
come citizens, made final by· legislation in 1924. This is cooptation 
since it involved the extension of political rights and participation to 
the Indians. The second instance was the establishment in 1933 of the 
policy of Indian Preference for BIA employment. This was participation 
in the state's bureaucracy governing Indian relations; hence it was co-
optation. Third, the Indian Reorganization Act's strengthening of tri-
bal government was cooptation, since the federal government was expand-
ing the role of Indian political participation in the system: through 
the medium of the tribe. Indians again had a tribal organization which 
could interact with the state. Fourth, the NCIO was a cooptive organiza-
tion created explicitly to give Indians participation in the state. A 
fifth example of cooptation was the creation of "Indian desks" in-cabi-
net departments. Sixth, there was the revival and extension of Indian 
Preference in 1972. Finally, there are the cases of Louis Bruce and 
Robert Bennet, the two Indians who were recently commissioners of the 
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BIA. 
Prior to looking at the outcomes of the specific cases of coopt-
ation, let us consider a related process which coexists with cooptation 
in the situation of the U.S. government and American Indians. The Amer-
ican government used various strategies to deal with the threat posed by 
the Indians. Assimilation was one overall policy goal of the state in 
attempting to defuse the Indian threat. Through such means as the allot-
ment policy, termination, government schools, and the Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act, government policy aimed at eliminating cultural differences 
between Indians and other Americans. If Indians became sufficiently 
similar to other Americans, the threat they posed, which derived ulti-
mately from their status as.members of an alien socio-cultural group, 
might cease. Cooptation can be connected with assimilation. First, it 
can be a means of assimilation. If the state gives members of a minor-
ity group political participation, the individual participants may shed 
some of their alien cultural characteristics through the experience of 
contact in political participation. A trickle-down effect to other mem-
bers of the group could take place. This could apply to the Indian Pre-
ference policy, for example. Cooptation can serve assimilation by in-
volving the minority group members in the normal processes of the sys":". 
tern. Secondly, cooptation can be a different means to the same end 
served by assimilation. One of the characteristics of a successful co-
optation is defusal of a threat, an end also shared by assimilation. It 
is interesting that cooptation of Indians did not begin until the 1920 1s, 
some 150 years after. their first dealings with the U.S. It might be 
hypothesized that cooptation of new subjects in a power system is not 
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possible until a certain period of assimilation has taken place. The 
new subjects must be sufficiently acquainted with the system for the 
legitimizing potential of cooptation to have some effect on them. Ano-
ther connection of cooptation with assimilation can be seen in the fact 
that two of the most significant efforts to coopt Indians took place 
under the guide of persons who also acted against assimilation. Collier, 
who supported Indian preference and the Indian Reorganization Act, was 
also an opponent of assimilation. Nixon repudiated termination, a pol~ 
icy which amounted to forced assimilation, and was president during an 
era of several cooptive procedures. There are several possible inter-
pretations of the trade-off between assimilation and cooptation. One 
would be to view Nixon and Collier as supportive of Indian rights by be-
ing both anti-assimilationist and pro-Indian self-determination. Another 
interpretation would be to conceive cooptation as an alternative to cul-
tural assimilation: If assimilation does not successfully defuse the 
cultural minority group, cooptation may be its substitute as a technique 
of control. Expansion of participation to a threat group has the addi-
tional adva~tage of being received more favorably than efforts to dimin-
ish its cultural uniqueness. 
One feature of cooptation alluded to in the theoretical discussion 
(Chapter I) is the 11 hostilellnature of the cooptee. This appears to be 
contradicted by the background of the members of the NCIO and by Indians' 
descriptions of BIA Indians as 11white-oriented. 11 Indian political parti-
cipants. almost appear as 11 friendlies 11 to the powerholder who are brought 
into the public sector rather like the executive placed on the board of 
directors of a corporation because he shares the interests of its owners. 
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However, seeing Indian participants as friendlies is not quite accurate. 
The BIA and NCIO Indians may be rela.tively assimilated into American 
political life, but they are participants because they are Indians, and 
they thereby carry the tag of membership in.! resistant group. Particu-
larly if the intention of the powerholder is to justify his power, it is 
only necessary to coopt persons who can be claimed to represent the 
threatening group. The less the actual participants are hostile to the 
powerholder, the better it is for him. Only in the most extreme cases 
of resistance (e.g., imminent revolution) might it be to the powerhold~ 
er's advantage to yield to the point of giving participation to persons 
who are actively hostile to him. From the powerholder's standpoint, it 
is better to coopt persons who are only symbolically hostile. 
The two key outcomes of any cooptation, within the model used here, 
are filtering and legitimacy payoffs. (see Chapter I). The issues in-
volved are, respectively: (1) Does the structure of participation oper-
ate to blunt the impact of the threat group on the state? and (2) Does 
increased participation increase people's favorableness to the power-
holder? Both of these outcomes are part of a more general issue, namely, 
the extent to which cooptation enhances the powerholder's control over 
resistance. For most of the instances of cooptation of Native Ameri~ .. 
cans, a judgement is possible abo.ut the success of the powerholder in 
gaining these outcomes. 
The Indian Preference policies of the BIA (both in 1933 and 1972) 
and the presence of Indians as BIA commissioners illustrate well a suc-
cessful filtering outcome. As detailed before, Indians exert little 
power through the BIA. The inefficiencies of the BIA, its location 
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within the Department of the Interior, the conflicts within Interior, 
the marginality of Indian problems within a cabinet department dealing 
primarily with other issues, the centralization of power in the BIA, and 
the typically low status occupied by Indians in the BIA all contribute 
to the blunting of Indian impact on the state. To exaggerate the pic-
ture, one might describe a typical BIA-employed Indian as a relatively 
powerless individual within a relatively powerless bureau that is only 
part of a larger department subject to control by the President and Con-
gress. The BIA's attraction of potential Indian leaders into its employ 
also filters the Indian threat. Within the BIA, educated, competent 
Indians work for an organization in which they can do little for the 
Indian; alternatively, they might have chosen to expend their efforts 
helping Indians as leaders of various kinds of resistance. While work-
ing in the BIA they become more assimilated to the dominant culture and 
cease to be viewed by Indians as truly Indian leaders, thus further di-
minishing their potential as popular leaders of resistance. 
In terms of the legitimacy payoff, the preference policy did little 
to increase the acceptance among Indians of the state and its policies. 
The Bureau's unpopularity among Indians comes not from its lack of Indi-
an personnel, but from its inefficacy in helping Indians and the excess-
ive control it exerts over them. Thus, a legitimacy payoff could not be 
realized among Indians through the establishment of preference policies. 
Despite a lack of direct evidence, one might conjecture that Indian Pre-
ference could serve to justify state Indian policy to non-Indians. If 
Indians are seen as the controllers of the BIA, its failures could be 
attributed to them rather than to the President, Congress, or other rep-
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resentatives of the state, thus displacing responsibility for Indian 
problems onto the victims. 
The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) is another good example of fil-
tering. The IRA revitalized tribes as political communities that could 
govern their citizens and deal with the federal government. However, 
despite the appearance of a genuine transfer of power, such did not oc-
cur. As Schusky (1970:13) emphasizes, most tribal politics have con-
cerned property. Land was deeded to tribes in a trust status under 
which the BIA, like a guardian overseeing his ward's affairs, was ulti-
mately responsible for the use made of the property. As a consequence, 
tribal constitutions (established under the IRA) frequently contain the 
phrase "subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior" (Schus-
ky, 1970:43). Tribal governments do not have final authority over ex-
penditures of their money o·r over the use of their land. If the BIA 
disagrees with a tribal council 1 s decision on property or expenditures, 
they can overturn it. As a result, "Indians are apathetic about their 
local governmentll and tribes I officers .are "without influence in their 
communities" (Schusky, 1970:14). Thus, the IRA accomplished filtering 
by allowing Indians a structure of participation (self~determination) 
subject to veto of the state. If Schusky is right in his assessment of 
Indian attitudes toward tribal government (and I have seen no evidence 
to the contrary), the legitimacy payoff of the IRA failed. Indians do 
not see the tribe as their own democratic government, but as an alien 
force ( 11 The Tribe".) coercing them and interfering with their lives, much 
like some "urban working class people look at the police force and city 
government" (Schusky, 1970:44). 
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The IRA illustrates another possible advantage of cooptation to the 
powerholder. When the state confronts a plurality of unorganized resist-
ant actors in the civil sector, there are many possible sources of dis-
ruption. In the limiting case, .each actor could engage in resistance. 
Since individual unorganized action is not the most effective mode of 
protest, the threat most likely faced by the powerholder here is that 
the dissidents will coalesce into several threat organizations. Coopta-
tion could forestall this by creating an organization through which re-
sistant actors may confront the state, a strategy which substitutes one 
source of threat for a possible plurality of sources. The resistance of 
organized actors may be more predictable insofar as the business of the 
organization is public. In the case of the IRA, the preceding allotment 
policy encouraged the atomization of Indians, whereas Reorganization 
created formal, public, tribal organizations. The government could now 
have more rationalized dealings with Indians, and created an organization 
which could serve to channel resistance through one public organization 
rather than through several (potential) movements. As a specific exam-
ple, the U.S. government could make land settlements legally through a 
single entity, the tribe, rather than through allotments to numerous 
individual Indians. 
The extension of citizenship to Indians has had filtering effects. 
Given that Indian population at the time (1924) numbered only a few 
hundred thousand, they could hardly have had impact on national elec-
tions. The citizenship act stipulated that gaining of the status of 
citizen was not to be construed as affecting Indian rights to tribal 
lands or other property (Schusky, 1970:21). This caveat.was probably 
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motivated by a desire that citizenship not eliminate any Indian rights. 
Neither, however, did this aspect of the citizenship decree eliminate 
the trust status of Indian lands. The extension of citizenship did not 
give Indians any significant additional control over their lives or prop-
erty; hence citizenship was filtered participation. Many Indians did not 
wish to be citizens, a situation which remains today. Citizenship was 
unilaterally 11 imposed 11 by the state. (Schusky, 1970:21) Indians I status 
·as citizens has been used to support their dependent position. When 
confronted with the demands of an Indian protest movement to restore 
the right of treaty making, the state used the Citizenship Act as one 
of its lines of argument in claiming that Indians could not have this 
right, as only foreign nations and not citizens could make treaties with 
the United States (Deloria, 1974:xi-xii). As with the preference policy 
of the BIA, the citizenship cooptation has had limited success as a means 
to increasing Indian support for the state. Any legitimacy payoff was 
more likely realized with other elements in the civil sector. Schusky 
(1970:23) sees the origin of the drive for Indian citizenship as arising 
from a stirring of 11 the national conscience 11 in the years preceding the 
1924 de~ree. This particularly happened among easterners who saw Indi-
ans as earning citizenship through the civilizing influence of farm owner-
ship and labor during the allotment period. It would have been among 
such people that any legitimacy payoff would be gained. 
The National Council on Indian Opportunity (NCIO), the most recent 
example of Indian cooptation;considered here, was probably oriented to 
the problem of justifying state Indian policy and engendering greater 
support for the government among Indians and their sympathizers. Lyndon 
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Johnson's (1970:438) speech that announced the creation of the NCIO was 
titled 11The Forgotten American 11 and beganwith a flowery tribute to the 
Indian followed by the recitation of a litany of Indian problems of the 
past and present. In the statement of the Indian members of the council 
(NCIO, 1970:205), there was recognition of the 11 symbolic importance 11 
(i.e., justifying effect) of their participation. In contrast, other 
evidence suggests that the NCIO had little impact on Indian public opin-
ion. A reading of numerous Indian newspapers (see Contemporary News-
papers of the North American Indian) for the periods surrounding John-
son's creation and Nixon's expansion of the NCIO shows little mention of 
this new organization. Only a few had articles on it, and in none was 
it praised or criticized strongly. Since there is almost no reaction to 
the NCIO, it could hardly have done much to increase the government's 
support among Indians. 
In terms of filtering, the NCIO presents a mixed situation. Its 
direct association with the vice-president of the U.S., and Nixon's 
adoption of the Indians• legislative proposals are evidence that the 
NCIO increased Indian impact on the state. On the other hand, the fail-
ure of the legislative program to pass is evidence of filtering in that 
concrete Indian interest could not be directly advanced through the NCIO. 
The excess of government representatives over Indian (eight to six) in-
sured that the state could always veto any problematic moves of the In-
dians, if need be. And finally, the NCIO as a whole had no real author-
ity, other than the mandate to make suggestions and recommendations. 
Any impact Indians had through the NCIO was due only to increased access 
to government officials, and not to a position of authority. To summa-
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rize, the NCIO was set up in such a way that filtering of any maneuvers 
by Indians was always possible, even if the state did not always take 
advantage of this. 
Conclusions 
In its relations with American Indians, the United States' govern-
ment has used techniques which may be viewed as cooptation. As the 
American power system has developed, Indians have continually been a 
threat to which it has had to adapt. The Indian nations within the 
United States, in their status as aboriginal and sovereign states with-
in the system, were a formal threat to its unity. As time has passed, 
the most disturbing aspect of the Indian threat has been legal, as the 
Indians have been able to use legal procedures and precedents to win 
lawsuits against the government. Cult~ral and political assimilation 
has been a goal toward which the government has striven in its attempts 
to neutralize the threat; actions that may be termed cooptation have 
also been used with success. The Indian Preference policy of the BIA, 
the Citizenship Act, the Indian Reorganization Act, and the National 
Council on Indian Opportunity are all cases of cooptation with success-
ful filtering payoffs, but the legitimacy payoffs have not been so ef-
fective. 
The way in which filtering took place in these cases suggests a 
clarification of the concept of filtering. The original formulation of 
filtering was somewhat too extreme, as it applied the term to cases in 
which a lessening of the impact of resistance occurs. On second thought, 
an actual lessening of resistance could only happen in the most extreme 
cases of cooptation, as when, hypothetically, an Indian resistance leader 
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takes a position in the BIA at the invitation of the government. It is 
more descriptively accurate to say that resistance is not necessarily 
lessened, but that the dissidents are not able to use their participa-
tion to exert more influence on the powerholder, despite the appearance 
of giving-in on the part of the state. In the filtering payoff the 
powerholder is more likely to preserve his control rather than extend 
it. In this more limited sense, filtering was definitely successful 
with all the cases of cooptation of Indians, since the evidence shows 
that the cooptive participation offered to Indians, although it may not 
have lessened Indian impact on the state, did not lessen the state's 
control over Indian affairs. 
Judgements about the success of legitimacy payoffs are more diffi-
cult. Again, there was misplaced emphasis in the threat model, as it 
concentrates on the justificatory potential of cooptation among the co-
optees and their constituents to the neglect of mentioning legitimacy 
payoffs among other actors. This introduces the idea of the relevance 
of third parties in many instances of cooptation. Certainly gains in 
legitimacy may be made among dissidents to whom political participation 
has been extended, but in none of the cases of Indian cooptation was 
there unequivocal evidence for increases in Indian support for the state 
based on the various extensions of participation. If anything, the evi-
dence suggests no effect, and in the operations of the BIA, the IRA, and 
the Citizenship Act, cooptation may even have decreased the popularity 
of the United States government with Indians. For the legitimacy pay-
off in Indian cooptation, one might look to non-Indians to see if the 
government 1 s cooptive Indian policies were received favorably among them. 
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At the.level of the model, it may be necessary to insert a third theo-
retical actor, namely other interested sympathetic potential dissidents, 
as a third element to be added to the dyad of coopting-powerholder and 
coopted-dissident. 
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CHAPTER III 
REVISION AND EXTENSION OF THE MODEL 
As was indicated at the end of the previous chapter, certain re-
finements of the initial model are suggested by the study of American 
Indians. At this point, I would like.to reiterate the threat model of 
cooptation, giving attention to these additions, as well as others. 
The basic framework of the discussion of cooptation, the power sys-
tem, can be retained as presented previously. The working definition is 
also adequate: Cooptation, within the .threat model, is defined as a 
process whereby actors (persons or_groups) who pose a threat to the 
powerholder are brought into positions and situations in which they 
participate in the official system. This definition of cooptation is 
markedly different from popular use of the term, and from the concept of 
cooptation used in either of the so-called political socialization models 
in Chapter I. In these other usages, cooptation may refer to almost any 
neutralization of a threat to the state. For example, popular use would 
describe intellectuals congenial to the powerholder as being coopted; 
the political socialization model would characterize as cooptive the 
various educational institutions that inculcate dominant political atti-
tudes into students. Neither of these would be considered cooptation in 
the threat model, as they do not involve extensions of political parti-
cipation to threatening actors. The only similarity these usages have 
with my model is their reference to interactions between powerholder and 
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threatening actors. The threat model of cooptation also diverges sharp-
ly from the traditional elite recruitment model, which describes a more 
narrow process. In the traditional model, cooptation is a constitution-
ally or traditionally provided procedure for recruiting new members of 
a system. The new members are not necessarily representative of threats, 
the purpose being rather to recruit qualified new members compatible 
with the interests of current members of the system. The similarity to 
the threat model is only that a system could, as Loewenstein says (1973: 
193) use cooptation (in the traditional sense) as a means to give parti-
cipation to threatening groups or actors, a process that would fit the 
traditional as well as the threat model. Other than this, there is lit-
tle overlap between the threat and traditional models. 
A central element of the threat model of cooptation is the expan-
sion of participation, and this process may now be.illustrated. Parti-
cipation in the official system does not denote only actual policy de-
termination, but as in the Indian case, includes maneuvers such as the 
following: (1) the extension of citizenship, which is the formal mini-
mum of participation in a bourgeois-democratic power-system; (2) employ-
ment in the BIA, another minimal form of participation, particularly if 
one considers the many Indians who are, for example, clerks in the BIA, 
a type of participation that is only symbolically political; (3) the 
IRA's restoration of limited _sovereignty for tribes; and·(4) the estab-
1 ishment of the NCIO, an organ specifically created to increase Indian 
access to the state. An understanding of the concept of official parti-
ci.pation does not come just from its literal definition; rather, what is 
necessary, if one wishes to use cooptation as an explanatory concept, is 
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to be sensitized to the variety of activities that can be seen as par-
ticipation. Specifically, when one uses the concept of cooptation, a 
recognition of the symbolic and ideological element in participation 
is crucial. In determining whether a yielding action by the powerholder 
is an expansion of participation, the question is not, at the outset, 
whether the participation is really political in the sense of allowing 
influence on policy, but whether the powerholder can define and present 
it to the public as political participation, and whether there is some 
possibility that it will be viewed as such by members of the civil sec-
tor. Not all yielding procedures, of course, are to be interpreted as 
the expansion of participation. Expanded participation involves at 
least the appearance of increased influence over policy via an official 
(legal) mechanism, and sometimes involves a genuine concession of poli-
tical control to the dissidents. However, in the usual case of coopta-
tion, the sociologist analyzing expanded participation must be attuned 
to the ideological aspect of cooptation, i.e., the powerholder's implied 
or explicit claim that he has now included the threatening actor in the 
official system of policy determination. The question of whether parti-
cipation is "real" or "meaningful" is temporarily bracketed. 
If cooptation is to have any meaning, this bracketing must cease at 
a later point in the analysis, a consideration that is embodied in the 
threat model of cooptation under the heading of legitimacy and filter-
ing payoffs, two concepts dealing with the neutralization of resistance ...fJ 
that frequently results from cooptation. Refinements of these concepts 
are also necessary. 
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Legitimacy, Audiences, and Threats 
The legitimacy payoff, as shown in the previous chapter, may not 
materialize· among the threatening actors themselves, but with other ac-
tors in the civil sector. Thus, cooptation typically involves a triad 
of powerholder (coopter), threat (cooptee), and audience. A model of 
the scenario of a legitimacy payoff is as follows: The threat group 
has withdrawn support from the powerholder, or may do so in the future; 
this actor is a potential source of resistance. Clearly, the powerhold-
er needs increased legitimacy among members of the threat group. But 
given the concept of a power system adopted early in this essay, the 
powerholder has potential legitimacy problems with all members of the 
civil sector as well. They are a possible target for legitimacy payoffs 
in addition to any realized with the threat group. Since members of a 
threat group are more aware of their situation than are other members of 
the civil sector, it is probably typical as in the Indian case that the 
legitimacy payoff would fail among them, with the threat group charging 
the powerholder with tokenism and the participating members of the group 
with 11 selling-out. 11 
It is different with the third party of the triad, the audience . 
. To be considered an audience to cooptation, an actor must find the 
,plight of the threat group sufficiently justified that he takes notice 
of what the powerholder does for the threat. The situation of the dis-
enfranchised threat group might interest the audience member because of 
an attachment to abstract principles, such as the sympathy for Indian 
self-determination held by many whites who are otherwise conservative. 
Or, again using the case of the United States, the relevant audience 
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might be international, as in the attempts to coopt various minorities 
through 11 affirmative action" for the purposes of demonstrating a concern 
for human rights to the Soviet Union, the Third World, etc. 
There are thus different types of audiences, varying in their rela-
tionship to the situation of power. Actors (collective or individual) 
within the civil sector who are sympathetic to the plight of the threat 
group but not actually members of it are one obvious type of audience. 
Their relationship to the powerholder is one of potential threat, as: 
mistreatment of the threat group may serve as an issue around which they 
may organize. Conversely, cooptation may function to defuse the issue, 
and delay or prevent the threat group's organizing; white sympathizers 
of Indians as mentioned above exemplify an audience in this situation. 
In the Indian case, it is relatively easy to distinguish the audience 
from the threat group, assuming one has a basis for distinguishing Indi-
ans from non-Indians. In other empirical cases of cooptation, the dis-
tinction between threat and sympathizer is not easy to make, particular-
ly when the threat group is not formally organized or otherwise bounded. 
A hypothetical example illustrates the problem: Suppose a powerholder 
coopts members of an incipient revolutionary movement. Is the threat 
group only those who actively work toward his overthrow, with the audi-
ence of sympathizers constituted by actors who are active only in the 
sense of holding beliefs opp6sing the powerholder? Or, is there some 
degree of opposition that distinguishes a mere sympathizer from a mem-
ber of the revolutionary threat group? The issue here is the transition 
from the conceptual to the empirical level. In the ideal-typical situa-
tion, an organized, bounded threat group which the coopted actors repre-
71 
sent is opposed to an unorganized audience of sympathizers. Empirically, 
this distinction cannot always be exactly mapped. 
Since I have not conceptually restricted threats to organized 
bounded groups, the distinction between the audience of sympathizers 
within the civil sector and the threat group must be clarified for sever-
al other types of threat mentioned in Chapter I. The first category of 
threat is organized opposition. This is quite similar to what Ralf 
Dahrendorf (1959:180) has termed an "interest group;" it has a leader-
ship, a program or ideology, and a consciousness of opposition to the 
powerholder. The audience can be distinguished by their lack of these 
characteristics of organization. The second type of threat is the com-
munity of interest, parallel to Dahrendorf's (1959:180) 11 quasi-group. 11 
Here members of the group share a basis of interest that opposes them to 
the state, but they are not organized and may not even be aware that 
they share this latent interest with others. An example can be found in 
the Marxian concept of a 11 class in-itsel f 11 but not 11 for itself; 11 the 
working class in this case constitutes a community of actors who share 
an interest but who are not conscious of it and who have not organized 
on this basis. A community of interest considered as a threat group is 
separable from the audience of sympathizers by virtue of the objectivity 
of the basis of the interest. 11 0bjectivity11 refers to the character of 
bases of interest such as occupation, ethnicity, or even, as Dahrendorf 
(1959:176) argues, the actor's power position as indicated by his member-
ship or non-membership in the ruling group of the power system. An audi-
ence member may believe the interest of the threat group to be justified, 
but cannot be said to belong to it if he does not share the objective 
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characteristics of its basis of interest. Intellectuals who support 
working class interests are an example of an audience sympathetic to a 
community of interest. 
The expansion of.! power system to include new actors (e.g., terri-
torial acquisition) defines another type of potential threat group. The 
audience of sympathizers within the system would be constituted out of 
the population of current subjects, and may thus be distinguished from 
the threat group composed of the new subjects. The boundary is not so 
distinct for the next type of threat, namely that created by an expan-
sion of the scope of control by the powerholder. For example, if the 
state begins intervention into economic life, actors holding varying 
positions within the economy and having interests that may be affected 
differently will constitute a number of communities of interest or or-
ganized oppositions. Consequently, the distinction between audience and 
the threat group can be made here only if we assume that some particular 
type(s) of threat group(s) will emerge after the expansion of scope. 
Thus, while a clear distinction between the threat group and audience 
of sympathizers within the system is possible conceptually, this dis-
tinction may be difficult to make in empirical cases in which the threat 
group cannot be bounded. 
There are also audiences outside the system in which cooptation 
takes place. Competitor systems are one type of external audience. Er-
rors in cooptation, such as the provision of filtered participation or a 
complete failure to include the threat group in participation may be a 
source of failures in the ideological conflict between the competing sys-
tems. If the competing system aligns itself with the threat group, the 
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coopting system's treatment of the threat provides an opportunity for 
the competitor to make ideological gains. The "Cold War" provides an 
example of this confrontation of power. If the U.S. does not include 
workers, minorities, socialists, etc., in the official structure of 
participation, or if a threat's participation is filtered, the Soviet 
Union (an external ideological competitor) may capitalize on this fail-
ure to coopt by claiming that the U.S. does not live up to its preten-
sions of democracy. Systems for whose allegiance the two systems com~ 
pete.'are another locus of legitimacy payoffs and failures when coopta-
tion occurs. The Third World is an example of this type of external 
audience. Cooptation of threat groups in the U.S. with whom the Third 
World countries are sympathetic may occasion legitimacy losses or gains, 
particularly if powerholders in the competing systems are eager to point 
these out. Though the examples of the external audiences have been 
drawn from the Cold War, the same competition may happen at more micro-
scopic levels. Any situation of ideological competition for the alle-
giance of actors outside the system could be the stage for a play of 
claims and counter-claims performed in relation to cooptation. 
Audiences can be found inside or outside the system where coopta-
tion occurs, but the audience must in some way find the situation of the 
threat group justified if the powerholder is to gain legitimacy in the 
eyes of the audience. It is to such audiences, in addition to the threat 
group, that the powerholder may orient attempts for a legitimacy payoff, 
and it is among audiences that successful legitimacy payoffs are most 
likely. Since the audience may.lack acquaintance with the threat 
group's situation, they are less likely to critically examine the mean-
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ingfulness of the expanded participation (except if the audience is a 
competitor} and are more likely to increase or maintain support for the 
powerholder on the basis of the cooptation. There are thus several pos-
sible targets for a legitimacy payoff: the threat group itself, the 
audience within the system, and the audience outside the system. 
Filtering: Channeling and Blunting 
Elaboration of the concept of filtering is also a result of the 
current investigation. In my original formulation, filtering was only 
vaguely defined as referring to the defusing of a threat group that may 
occur when its resistance is directed into the official structure of 
participation. In.the application of filtering to the case of Indians, 
the emphasis was on the degree of impact on the powerholder permitted by 
the Citizenship Act, the NCIO, the IRA, and Indian Preference. Filter-
ing indicated in a general way that cooptation may function to lessen 
the possibility of effective resistance by the threat group. Actually, 
there are two separate processes involved in filtering. The aspect em-
phasized in the Indian case may be called blunting. This refers to the 
effect of structures of participation (e.g., Indian employment in the 
BIA} that allow minimal Indian influence over policy and slight impact 
on the powerholder. The other aspect of filtering I term channeling. 
This occurs when members of a threat group, having accepted officially 
provided participation, cease resistance via other means (e.g., riot, 
strike, demonstration} and confine their activities to those possible 
within the official structure. 
From the powerholder's point of view, channeling is a particularly 
advantageous outcome; resistance arises from a more limited source, and 
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because it comes through the structure of participation, blunting is 
also possible. However, channeling obtains in limited circumstances 
only, viz .. :ones in which the threat group resists solely through the 
structure of participation that the powerholder has offered. First, 
channeling may develop if the tradition of acceptable protest in the 
system is such that the threat will lose popular support if its protest-
ing is not channeled through the filter. The powerholder might then 
successfully label continued protest as unjustified, since he has al-
ready given the threat an official channel for protest. The likely re-
sult is that the threat group, if they were to continue resistance, 
would lose actual or potential support from other members of the civil 
sector. Examples like this do occur, as when men polemically ask "What 
do these women want?" in response to women (a threat group) who continue 
to mount demands despite the existence of governmental affirmative ac-
tion policies, a filtering mechanism viewed by some men as already too 
much of a concession to women. Here, the state can with some success 
channel the resistance of many women into the filter of organizational 
employment sponsored through affirmative action. Men may thus circum-
scribe the resistance of women by opposing women's demands beyond those 
granted by affirmative action. Secondly, channeling might occur if the 
threat accepted its participation as completely "meaningful," 11 realis-
tic,11 and adequate and voluntarily limited resistance to actions within 
the filtered structure of participation. Or, the powerholder might of-
fer participation before organized or open resistance took place, thus 
providing an outlet for resistance before the threat developed the con-
sciousness of an organized opposition that would lead to open resistance 
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and a critical attitude toward the nature of participation. Finally, 
channeling may occur through an implicit or explicit bargain whereby the 
threat group agrees to give up extra-legal resistance in exchange for 
participation in the official structure. These examples show how chan-
neling might happen. Though for conceptual purposes I have presented 
channeling as if it were a categorical process that either occurs com-
pletely or not at all, empirically there is variability in the extent to 
which the threat group confines its activities to official participation 
in lieu of other forms of resistance. 
The other, more common aspect of filtering, what I have called 
blunting, can occur independently of channeling. Whether or not the 
threat group chooses or is forced to restrict resistance to the official 
channel, the influence allowed by official participation may be slight. 
Participation via a bureaucratic mechanism is a typical form of blunted_ 
participation; the case of the BIA shows how participation within a 
large bureaucracy affords little influence over policy, even for parti-
cipants occupying high-level positions. Because the coopted participant 
in a bureaucracy must function within a relatively fixed set of regula-
tions, and because the organization in which he participates may, like 
the BIA, be buried within a larger organization, any impact of the co-
optee on the powerholder can be neutralized. A judgement about the im-
pact on the powerholder requir.es comparison of the influence on the 
powerholder from the threat 1 s other possible exertions of power outside 
the official structure of participation. The question of 11 possible 11 
acts of power is particularly interesting. Here one must engage in a 
mental experiment about what might be if the threat group were to pursue 
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their interest in some other way. Using such a criterion, blunting can 
be found even among seemingly meaningful modes of participation when 
these are compared with alternative avenues for political participation. 
When threat groups charge tokenism or "selling-out" or cooptation (in 
the popular sense), this is what they implicitly refer to: They are 
denigrating the offered participation, even though it may offer consider-
able influence, in comparison with another hypothetical distribution of 
power: The adequacy of the participation provided by the Indian Reor-
ganization Act, which app~ared as a real ste~ towards self-determination, 
is blunted in comparison with the power Indian tribes would hold if they 
regained a semblance of their original sovereignty.l 
The concept of filtering can be further elaborated by considering 
the combinations of its two aspects, blunting and channeling. This sug-
gests an ordering of the possible filtering outcomes from least to most 















low impact on the powerholder allowed by the structure 
of participation 
limitation of resistance to that possible through the 
structure of participation 
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(1) Open impact. This is the least successful outcome for the 
powerholder. He has ceded some control to the threat group by giving them 
high impact ( 11 meaningful 11 ) participation, yet the dissidents continue 
resistance outside the official structure, since their participation is 
not channeled. As an example, I suggest the hypothetical case of a re-
volutionary labor movement that accepts and uses effective trade unions 
(an official structure,of participation) but continues to attempt to 
make a revolution. 
(2) Channeled impact. For the powerholder, this is somewhat more 
successful. He has gained the advantage of dealing with a more limited 
source of resistance but high impact means that he has lost control to 
some extent. Again, trade unions provide an example. A company might 
permit a union for its workers, even allowing them real bargaining power, 
yet still enhance control. The advantage would come from the predicta-
bility and stability of contracting with one organized agent (the union), 
thereby limiting the sources of resistance. To some degree, the history 
of labor unions in the United States fits this pattern. 
(3) Incomplete filtering. The structure of participation permits 
little impact but the threat group continues to resist by other means. 
The cooptation of American Indians is an example here. Despite the ex-
pansion of blunted participation for Indians (BIA, IRA, etc.) during the 
twentieth century, they have maintained resistance in the form of law-
suits, demonstrations, and land takeovers. 
(4) Complete:filtering .. This is the most successful for the power-
holder, since he has realized payoffs in both channeling and blunting. 
For an example, imagine a nation-state where resistance outside of the 
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established political party is illegal or otherwise dealt with harshly. 
The powerholder could bring dissidents into the party, where their re-
sistance will be relatively blunted. Channeling would be enforced by 
sanctions against resistance outside of the party structure. 
Changes in the filtering outcomes of cooptation are possible over 
time. The use of the terms 11 incomplete 11 and 11 complete 11 filtering indi-
cate this. Originally, a powerholder may establish blunted participa-
tion without any channeling, but over time, the official structure of 
participation may come to be institutionalized and legitimized as the 
only means of resistance. The various forms of affirmative action (in-
cluding Indian Preference), although they are blunted forms of partici-
pation, may as time passes become the only legitimized channel for the 
protesting of the coopted threat groups. Similarly, open impact may 
change into channeled impact. If an institutional channel for resist-
ance is provided, the threat group may find it increasingly difficult 
to recruit new members into an organized opposition resisting outside 
of the official channel. A threat group that has been given open impact 
participation may find losses of support with potential sympathizers if 
they continue open resistance. The result in either situation would be 
that a group that originally resists through a variety of tactics may 
find itself forced to restrict its resistance to that possible through 
the official structure of participation. The channeling aspect of fil-
tering may thus require a period of time to develop. 
The payoff of two of the filtering outcomes particularly depends on 
their connection with legitimacy payoffs. Incomplete filtering in it-
self holds no benefit for the powerholder and does entail costs and 
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risks. Incomplete filtering costs the powerholder at least the incon-
venience of arranging for recruiting participants and setting and main-
taining the structure of participation (e.g., the expense of running the 
affirmative action programs in the U.S.); there is furthermore the risk 
that the impact will be higher than the powerholder anticipated. Defi-
nitionally, the presence of channeling is not included in incomplete 
filtering. Therefore, the threat will keep on with its other tactics 
of resistance as well as the blunted resistance allowed within the 
structure of participation. Apparently, there is no gain made by incom-
plete filtering. The advantage lies in its tie to legitimacy payoffs. 
The powerholder may publicize the blunted participation as meaningful, 
audiences inside or outside the system may view it as a genuine conces-
sion to the threat, and legitimacy gains may be the result. Incomplete 
filtering is useful as a technique to increase legitimacy without incur-
ring the risk of high-impact participation. The other benefit in incom-
plete filtering, of course, is the possibility that it will develop into 
complete filtering. The open impact outcome, also apparently a failure 
for the powerholder, may be beneficial in a similar way. Suppose that 
the powerholder knows that he must yield to the threat group at some 
point. By choosing cooptation (with open impact participation), he may 
increase legitimacy to the extent that he can avoid more severe yielding 
in the future. Any of the four filtering outcomes could be matched with 
the presence or absence of a legitimacy payoff with the audience or 
threat group; the combination of these would give 16 different types of 
outcomes. This is too elaborate to be useful at this point. 2 The issue 
is that there are wide variety of types of outcomes, ranging from open 
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impact/no legitimacy gain with audience or threat to complete filtering/ 
increased legitimacy with audience and threat. Determination of the 
success of an instance of cooptation could take account of all of the 
possible combinations of legitimacy and filtering payoffs. 
The focus on filtering and legitimacy payoffs should not be inter-
preted to mean that the powerholder always successfully defuses a threat 
via cooptation, or even intends to do so. Cooptation may be a genuine 
yielding, and may lead to further changes in the powerholder's program. 
The powerholder may decide, as in attempts to bring blacks into posi-
tions of power (i.e., federal judgeships), that he must modify the 
state's original opposition to deliberate inclusion of representatives 
of a particular group. The powerholder may coopt because he feels the 
threat group deserves representation, and thereby yield to their pres-
sure. The participation given by the state to cooptees may allow high 
impact; it may involve a position of considerable influence. Once the 
cooptee has entered the official system of power, he may be able to use 
the provisions of the system against the powerholder. A black judge may 
insist on adherence to the law, and thereby place the powerholder in the 
position of having to openly violate the law or adhere to it in ways 
beneficial to the threat group .. As mentioned in the first chapter, 
structures of participation created for a threat group may develop into 
much more consequential organs than the powerholder anticipated. The 
Third Estate in France, and the House of Burgesses in England began as 
relatively inconsequential cooptive structures of participation, but be-
came one of the chief ruling elements within their respective states. 
Cooptation may thus entail modification of the program of the power-
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holder. 
Characteristics of the Cooptee 
11 Who gets coopted, 11 i.e., the characteristics of the actors brought 
into participation, affects the form and success of cooptation. Until 
now, this problem has been overlooked in the present essay. Matters of 
terminology point to this issue, as when I have referred to the coopta-
tion of a threat group. It may appear a misnomer to speak of a group 
being coopted, except when the powerholder expands participation to in-
clude all members of a group. There are examples of an entire group be-
ing brought into participation, as in expansions of suffrage -0r in or-
ganizational rearrangements (such as the Indian Reorganization Act) that 
bring a group into a different relationship to power. More typically, a 
relatively few 11 representatives 11 of the coopted group enter into the 
structure of participation. Sometimes, the powerholder may appoint the 
actual cooptees, in which case they (e.g., the Indian members of the 
NCIO) only putatively represent the threat group. In other cases, the 
cooptees are true representatives, tied to their constituency by an 
election or other selective procedure. However, even if the cooptees 
are selected in an election controlled by the threat group, the power-
holder has in a sense structured the selection, since only persons will-
ing to 11 work within the system 11 will likely apply for the positions. 
The small number of cooptees and their relation of representation to the 
threat group are crucial to seeing the uniqueness of cooptation as a 
technique of power. It can be an efficient device for reducing the com-
plexity of resistance when protest is channeled through a few represent-
atives. The fact that the cooptees' participation symbolizes that of an 
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entire group is what allows the powerholder to make legitimacy gains by 
claiming inclusion of a threat group, when actually he may have selected 
11 representatives 11 compatible with his own views. Indians brought into 
the BIA, for example, are selected at the discretion of the state. For 
the powerholder, then, the object in recruiting actual cooptees is to ac-
quire those who symbolically represent the threat group, who will be 
seen by the threat group and other audiences as genuine representatives, 
yet who actually are not so far from his own views. The purpose of the 
powerholder and the outcome of cooptation is not usually to neutralize 
the particular individuals coopted, but to neutralize the group threaten-
ing him. This and the cooptees' representation of the group are what 
makes the apparent misnomer 11 cooptation of a ~ 11 a meaningful use of 
the term. 
Thus far, I have focused on the cooptation of threat groups via the 
inclusion of representatives or through group inclusions such as suff-
rage expansions. But as my definition of cooptation indicates, the 
threatening actors that the powerholder coopts may be persons as well as 
groups. Certainly, there are occasions when the powerholder might wish 
to coopt particular persons. The example of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn shows 
a single individual can be a threat by creating legitimacy problems, even 
for a large modern state. Without initial group backing, such an actor 
may dissent against the powerholder in a way that foreshadows the rise 
of popular resistance. It might benefit the powerholder to coopt such 
a person and channel his resistance into the official structure by of-
fering him a position within the state administration or by giving him 
an institutionalized voice in policy decisions. Another situation in 
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which cooptation of a certain individual might be necessary could occur 
if a threat group (such as early Christians) were to have its existence, 
unity, and organization tied to the person of a particular leader. If 
the state coopts the leader, the result might involve less severe yield-
ing than would be necessary if the threat group were allowed to develop 
further or if its leader were negatively sanctioned by the state. The 
phrase "divide and conquer" is applicable when the powerholder can bring 
leaders of threat groups into the official structure, which makes the 
leaders subject to the rewards (promotion, power, prestige) that parti-
cipation in the state can offer. If the threat group's leader(s) can be 
drawn off by the powerholder, its unity and existence may dissolve. 
Pontius Pilate might well have coopted Jesus Christ before he was cru-
cified. Note that in these cases, the person is coopted not in his 
capacity as proxy for a threat group as in the cooptation of a group, 
but because of his personal power (as an internationally respected dis-
senter in the example of Solzhenitsyn or as the nucleus of group organ-
ization in the case of Christ). 
However, my emphasis on cooptation of a .group is well-founded. The 
possibility or actuality of group res.istance underlies all serious 
threats. What must concern the powerholder facing a Solzhenitsyn or a 
Christ is not that this one person opposes him, but that a mass of peo-
ple will come to oppose the policies. The group basis of threat is ob-
vious in such threats as the organized opposition or community of inter-
est. Therefore, cooptation of a group (in the sense discussed above) is 
most relevant. Unless_ it is possible to coopt a leader of the threat 
group the only cooptive counter to group threat is group cooptation, 
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wherein the inclusion of a few individuals may neutralize group threat 
via the legitimacy or filtering payoffs. 
Situations Conducive to Cooptation 
The concept of threat has appeared throughout this essay. Obvious-
ly, cooptation can only be expected when threats can emerge, and the 
character of the threat conditions the occurrence of cooptation. Coopta-
tion does not, however, bear a simple or 11 linear 11 relationship to the 
severity of threat. Under conditions of relatively slight threat, where 
the threatening actor has little countervailing power, cooptation is 
unlikely, as the powerholder may safely ignore the threat. In the QEEQ_-
site situation, that of severe threat, cooptation may also not occur, as 
a well-organized threat group may have sufficient power to gain high-
impact participation if it is coopted, thus eliminating filtering pay-
offs to the powerholder. However, cooptation is quite possible, what-
ever the severity of the threat. A powerholder may coopt a minor threat 
because he Gan afford to give them blunted participation, gain legiti-
macy payoffs with various audiences, yet incur little objection from the 
threat group over the quality of their participation. If the threat is 
not severe (i.e., if it has little power), members may accept any of~ 
fered participation, and they certainly will not be able to demand ef-
fective participation, lacking as they do the power to extract such a 
bargain. In contrast, a powerful group may be able to force the power-
holder to include it in an official structure of participation in ex-
change for cessation of certain types of resistance. Thus, one cannot 
argue~ priori for a simple correspondence between the severity of 
threat and the probability of cooptation. Particular circumstances can 
86 
make cooptation an advantageous or impractical choice for the power-
holder, whether the threat is severe or not. 
This is not to say that the existence of threats is not conducive 
to cooptation. The presence of threat is a defining element of my con-
cept of cooptation. More importantly, cooptation is a means of dealing 
with threats, and therefore can be a typical or common process only in 
social situations in which threats arise. The relevant problem is to 
explicate the situations that are conducive to the emergence of threat 
and hence to the existence of cooptation. 
A social situation must be politicized if cooptation is to be a 
feasible process. By politicization it is meant that the political 
questions of what is legitimate rule, whose demands are to be acceded 
to, who is to decide for the whole, and so forth are .. present in the 
situation. While all social situations, societies, and organizations 
,contain the elements of power and resistance, there is variation in the 
urgency with which the aforementioned questions present themselves. For 
contrast, compare the level of politicization of a family, where power, 
though present, is exercised informally, to that of a nation-state, 
where a defined set of leaders exercise power on an explicit formal 
basis. Since threats are not likely in the less politicized situation, 
cooptation, as a response to threat, cannot there be as common a process. 
The expansion of the scope of control in a system, whether the ex-
pansion is intensive or extensive, encourages cooptation. As was sug-
gested in Chapter I, legitimacy is more problematic as a consequence of 
the expansionist process; in other words, threats become more likely. 
Territorial (extensive) expansion almost necessarily creates threats by 
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the forceful inclusion of new subjects within the scope of power. When 
the powerholder claims control over a new sphere of life (e.g., econo-
mics), the effect on interests inherent in the previous arrangement will 
generate threats. In either case, the powerholder must find ways of 
softening the impact of resistance. He may choose or be forced to pro-
vide participation to new subjects; filtered participation oriented to 
a legitimacy payoff could serve the double purpose of softening resist-
ance and increasing support. 
While expansion of power encourages cooptation, cooptive mane·uvers 
may also occur in systems undergoing contraction via a crisis of legiti-
macy. The Democratic Party in the U.S. did exactly this when, faced 
with a loss of traditional left-liberal membership and support in the 
aftermath of the 1968 convention, they created a new arm of the party 
( 11 Newdeck 11 ) to give participation to the disaffected left-wing element. 
This illustrates how cooptation, in a declining power system, may be 
used to draw in new elements and retain the old in an attempt to pre-
serve the system. 
Politicization and expansion are two factors conducive to coopta-
tion because they facilitate the emergence of threats within the system. 
Other conditions encourage cooptation insofar as they affect the possi-
bility of filtering and legitimacy payoffs. 
To the extent that the state is bureaucratized, filtering outcomes 
are more likely; this would encourage the powerholder to choose coopta-
tion. Political participation through a bureaucratic structure, exem-
plified by the BIA, wi.11 result in at least blunted participation. The 
cooptee will have at best influence over the means of administration 
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rather than policy. The symbolic halo of such an organization has dis-
torting effects also: One can work for the BIA as a secretary, having 
no influence over the means or ends of policy, yet symbolically be re-
presented as having been given responsibility for the fate of Indians. 
The state may report that 50 percent of its employees in a minority 
affairs agency are members of the relevant ethnic group, without men-
tioning that 90 percent of them are clerks, secretaries, and janitors. 
Again taking the BIA as an example, the hierarchical network of author-
ity in state bureaucracies means that even the highest level of func-
tionaries will have relatively little influence over policy. The bureau-
cratization of the state therefore encourages cooptation, since by fa-
cilitating filtering outcomes, it provides a motivation for cooptation. 
Formally democratic systems, that is, ones which hold to a demo-
cratic ideology and in which the legitimacy of the exercise of power is 
tied to the provision of opportunities for citizen input into the poli-
tical process, are conducive to cooptation. The ideological necessity 
for citizen input can be matched wit~the:cooptive inclusion of threaten-
ing actors in an official structure of participation. If the ideologi~ 
cal emphasis is on formal democracy, the focus will be on the possibil-
ity of input by citizens rather than on performance by the powerholder 
which reflects.the interests and desires of the people. Here there is 
a fit with the blunting aspect of filtering payoffs, a process in which 
there is low impact on the powerholder despite the threat's input through 
the structure of participation. Cooptation with successful filtering and 
legitimacy payoffs could easily result if the ideology stresses the 
formal (input) aspects of participation. Under these circumstances, the 
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powerholder could provide blunted participation and still secure in-
creased legitimacy, if the people expect the formal aspect of partici-
pation rather than the impact of their participation on the powerholder 
and his subsequent performance. 
Systems with an established tradition of formal democracy also 
furnish a motive for cooptation by being conducive to channeling pay-
offs. Formal democracy i~volves not only the prescriptive emphasis on 
citizen input, but also the proscription of resistance via extra-offi-
cial or extra-legal means. This provides a mechanism to channel re-
sistance exclusively into the official structure of participation. 
Threat groups who accept participation in the official structure will 
meet with little popular support if they continue to mount unofficial 
resistance against the background of an ideology that prescribes dissent 
through official, institutionally-arranged channels. Loss of support 
with sympathizers in the audience would serve as a force to deflect 
their resistance into the cooptive official structure of participation. 
The connection of democracy with cooptation may seem a cynical out-
look unless.one recalls that the neutralization of threat by cooptation 
is only a possible outcome and may not even be intended by the power-
holder. Cooptation,:as in the example df student participation in uni-
versity governance and in the case of the cooptation of the Indians, 
can be the outcome of democratically motivated persons attempting to 
further self-determination by providing the formal means of democracy. 
As a caution, it should be noted that the resemblance of cooptation to 
some aspects of democratic procedure is only partial. Without attempt-
ing a complete definition of democracy, I would suggest that democracy 
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an an ideal-type involves at least two criteria: The actions of the 
state must attend to and reflect the needs and desires of all citizens, 
and that this be accomplished via the widest possible political parti-
cipation on the part of citizens. Although coopatation has a formal 
similarity to democratic procedure in its extension of representation 
and participation to a wider spectrum of actors, this is only part of 
democracy, the formal (input) aspect, and cooptation has no necessary 
relation to the substantive ideal that the state serve the interests of 
the people. The latter criterion is particularly unlikely to be real-
ized in cases where filtering payoffs occur. If one attaches a further 
characteristic to democracy, namely that the people have control over 
selection procedures for their representatives, cooptation violates 
this, as cooptation usually involves the exercise of selectivity by the 
powerholder when cooptees ( 11 representatives 11 ) are chosen. 
The discussion of formally democratic systems shows that, despite 
the apparent antithesis between cooptation, potentially a deceptive 
technique for quelling resistance, and democracy, with its principle of 
state responsiveness to the people, there is a connection between coopt-
ation and certain features of democracy. It goes without saying that 
totalitarian systems are prone to coopt. There are at least two reasons 
for this. For one, totalitarian systems represent the extreme of inten-
sive expansion of the state; the state has assumed control over all 
possible spheres of life in these systems. The more areas of social 
life the state controls, the more possible settings there are in which 
interests of actors in the civil sector may be adversely affected. To-
talitarian systems therefore generate may potential threats. Another 
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characteristic of totalitarian systems is their intolerance to any level 
of threat; they do not have the commitment to allow a certain degree of 
resistance that, for example, a democratic system would. Cooptation, as 
compared to coercion, is generally less costly (in terms of legitimacy) 
as a means of neutralizing threats. The powerholder in a totalitarian 
system may thus frequently choose cooptation rather than coercion as a 
technique for dealing with threats. Keeping in mind the constant back-
ground of threat faced by the state in totalitarian systems and the de-
struction of legitimacy that would occur were coercion to be frequently 
used, one can see why totalitarian systems are so prone to coopt. 
To summarize, then, the following conditions are conducive to co-
optation: 
(1) Politicization, as it indicates situations where threat groups 
arise, and where legitimacy can be a problem for the powerholder. 
(2) Expansion of the scope of control, as it almost necessarily 
generates threat groups, and creates a need for increased legitimacy 
among the new subjects of power. 
(3) Formal democracy, since powerholders committed to the input 
aspect of democracy will likely expand participation to threat groups, 
and may thereby realize legitimacy and channeling payoffs. 
(4) Bureaucratization of the state, since by facilitating filter-
ing payoffs, it provides increased reason for the powerholder to coopt. 
(5) Totalitarianism, as the total state 1 s intolerance to the 
threats it generates produces the need to neutralize threats. 
This catalogue of factors conducive to cooptation is one of the 
achievements of this monograph.. I wish to close by recapitulating the 
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outlines of my work and its other accomplishments. I began by using the 
power system as the basic framework of analysis, something that had not 
been previously done with the concept of cooptation. A working model of 
cooptation was adopted. A review of the literature demonstrated the 
variety of meanings that the term has been given. All previous uses 
of cooptation were shown to be deficient in some respect. The concept 
of threat, however, emerged as a latent element in all previous models 
of cooptation. In the next chapter, the case of American Indians was 
used to illustrate my working definition of cooptation and two key con-
cepts, filtering and legitimacy payoffs. The last chapter accomplished 
several things. The basic concepts of the model, namely threat group, 
participation, legitimacy payoffs, and, filtering payoffs were elabor-
ated. The importance of audiences to legitimacy payoffs were highlight-
ed, and the concept of filtering was divided i~to channeling and blunt-
ing. The particular efficiency of cooptation as a means to deal with 
threat groups was noted. Finally, I mentioned the several conditions 
that are likely to lead to cooptation. 
The threat model of cooptation provides heuristic concepts that may 
be applied to power systems at any level of analysis, be it the family, 
the formal organization, the nation-state, or the world system. It is 
hoped that this essay provides a useful approach to the analysis of co-
optation that can be substituted for the unsystematic orientations that 
previously have been available for the study of this common but theoret-
ically neglected process of power. 
ENDNOTES 
1De1oria (1974:especia11y Chapters 7 and 8) provides an interest-
ing i11ustration of what this wou1d mean by suggesting that Indian 
tribes be given the internationa1 status of dependent but sovereign 
nations such as Monaco or.Luxembourg. 
2The quantitative1y-oriented researcher cou1d construct a 1ogica11y 
ordered Guttman sca1e from these dichotomies which cou1d measure the 
successfu1ness of an instance of cooptation. 
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